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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust laws are crucial for the functioning of a free market econ-
omy because they seek to keep markets open and to prevent the aggrega-
tion and exercise of market power. Government enforcement of the
antitrust laws fosters the ability of firms to battle in the marketplace,
ideally making consumers the ultimate beneficiaries of that competition.
This view of government enforcement has thrust the enforcement of anti-
trust laws into the forefront under President Clinton's administration.
To understand the importance of antitrust in the Clinton Administra-
tion, it is necessary to begin with a perspective of the three predecessor
administrations. Antitrust is often described in terms of ideological sw-
ings. During the Reagan Administration it took a strong swing towards
the "right." A major part of that administration's economic program was
to reduce government regulation. Antitrust enforcement was perceived
as being overly intrusive, out of control, and highly regulatory. In the
1970s, during President Carter's administration, the agencies focused
their resources on major corporations such as AT&T, Exxon and IBM,
seeking to attack perceived abuses of market power, sometimes using
somewhat novel theories of harm. The Reagan Administration consid-
ered most of these cases as an economic waste and viewed antitrust en-
forcement as imposing a tax on the activities of business. The Reagan
Administration introduced several initiatives that focused antitrust en-
forcement away from a perceived preoccupation with the conduct of
large businesses towards conduct that was more traditionally viewed as
economically anticompetitive, primarily the activities of cartels and other
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collusive arrangements.' The resources of the antitrust enforcement
agencies were substantially reduced during the Reagan Administration.2
Some remaining resources were redirected towards local criminal con-
spiracies (usually involving bid-rigging) and competition-reducing codes
of conduct promulgated by associations of small businesses and profes-
sions. Most of these cases involved relatively local conspiracies, and the
impact on commerce of these enforcement actions was modest at best.
The government's ability to litigate cases effectively seemed to be much
in doubt. For example, the government's IBM litigation lasted for over a
decade without any appearance of resolutiofi. 3 In general, the govern-
ment's civil antitrust enforcement program was all but extinguished, and
no monopolization cases were brought during the Reagan
Administration.
Similarly, merger enforcement was periodic at best, and the govern-
ment's efforts at litigating merger cases were generally unsuccessful. 4 In
spite of doubts that it was enshrining lenient enforcement policy, in 1982
the Department of Justice ("DOJ" or "Department") adopted new merger
guidelines that made merger analysis far more analytically dependable. 5
The Reagan Administration sponsored legislation to amend the Clayton
Act to create an "efficiencies" defense and require greater consideration
of foreign competition. 6 Most mergers were found safe from any risk of
creating competitive harm despite the significant size and market share
of a firm created by the merger, often because the agencies were quick to
accept arguments about low entry barriers. Vertical merger7 or potential
competition merger8 enforcement was practically nonexistent.
1 See, e.g., William J. Baer & David A. Balto, The Politics of FederalAntitrust Enforce-
ment, 23 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 113 (Fall 1999); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy in a
Clinton Administration, 62 ANirrnusT L.J 217 (1993); Nolan E. Clark, Antitrust Comes Full
Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Standard, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1125 (1985).
2 Staffing at the FTC was reduced by 45 %. See FTC Budget Branch, Full Time
Equivalent History, (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/finance/apphsii.htm>.
3 See In re IBM Corp., 475 F.Supp.1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd 618 F.2d 923 (2' Cir.
1980), mandamus granted, 687 F.2d 591 (2"n Cir. 1982).
4 See John E. Lopatka & James F. Mongoven, After Preliminary Relief in Merger Cases
is Denied, What Then?, 17 REs. L. & ECON. 149 (1995).
5 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssioN, 1982 MERGER GumF-
LINES (1982), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (June 30, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 MERGER
GUmELNES].
6 This legislation did not pass.
7 A vertical merger is the acquisition of a company that either buys from or sells to the
acquiring company. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962) (holding
that market foreclosure is the "primary vice" of an anticompetitve vertical merger).
8 A potential competition merger is defined by what it is not - it is not horizontal and it
is not vertical. Mergers of firms in wholly separate industries are 'rarely challenged; most
challenged conglomerate mergers are geographic market extension mergers, see United States
v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 405 U.S. 952 (1973), or product market extension mergers, see United
States v. Continental Can Co., 387 U.S. 441 (1964).
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During the Bush Administration, under the leadership of Janet Stei-
ger at the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Chairman") and Assis-
tant Attorney General James Rill at the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, the pendulum swung back in the other direction,
and there was an attempt to bring antitrust enforcement to a more even
keel. The Bush Administration made some efforts to expand civil litiga-
tion and bring cases under more novel theories of competitive harm. 9
Merger enforcement increased but the government's success record was
still modest at best. Criminal enforcement continued to focus on rela-
tively small bid rigging cases.' 0 Perhaps most importantly, the Bush Ad-
ministration stopped the drain on funding for the antitrust enforcement
agencies.
The Clinton Administration's antitrust enforcers faced a threefold
challenge. First, the antitrust agencies needed to improve their ability to
perform their core mission - enforcement of the antitrust laws. Second,
the Administration needed to determine how to contribute to the develop-
ment of a competition policy in a fast changing economy in which the
relevance of antitrust was being called into question. Third, the Admin-
istration needed to improve the "antitrust process" to both reduce bur-
dens on business while utilizing the agencies' limited resources
effectively.
This article examines why antitrust enforcement has become more
prominent, and in what respects current antitrust enforcement is different
than that of earlier administrations. Part I of the article explores the cur-
rent enforcement of the antitrust laws in the areas of criminal enforce-
ment, merger enforcement, enforcement in high-technology markets,
distributional restraints and dominant firm conduct. In light of the effi-
cacy of enforcement in those areas, Part II examines how the enforce-
ment agencies under the Clinton Administration have developed a
competition policy and made that policy transparent. Part 1I surveys the
process of antitrust enforcement, and how the agencies have improved
that process to reduce burdens on business. For each of these issues, the
article attempts to describe how the current administration has sought to
improve the work of the antitrust agencies to better promote the competi-
tive process and benefit consumers.
1 9 See, e.g., In re Quality Trailer Products Corp., FTC No. C- 3403, 57 Fed. Reg. 55,539
(Nov. 25, 1992) (consent order) (regarding invitations to collude).
10 The typical cases involved bid-rigging on some type of product purchased by govern-
ment agencies, typically by local or state governments and usually on highway construction.
See, e.g., United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 741 F.2d 730 (50' Cir. 1984), United States v.
Rubbish Removal, Inc., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,617 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). While such
cases were useful and many were brought, many did not involve consumer products, and this
tended to limit the total amount of commerce involved.
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I. ENFORCEMENT
During the 1990s, the antitrust agencies have reinvigorated their en-
forcement programs, and both the number and economic significance of
their enforcement actions have grown. Their increased efforts are con-
centrated in five areas: (1) criminal enforcement, primarily involving in-
ternational cartels, (2) merger enforcement, (3) enforcement in high
technology markets, (4) distributional restraints, and (5) dominant firm
conduct.
A. CRIMnNAL ENFORCEMENT
The greatest single change in antitrust enforcement policy has prob-
ably come in the area of criminal enforcement. The Clinton Administra-
tion dramatically refocused this program, switching the attention of the
criminal antitrust enforcers from relatively small domestic conspiracies
to much larger international cartels. In so doing, the Department of Jus-
tice greatly increased the amounts collected in fines, securing over 1.1
billion dollars in fiscal year 1999 (FY 1999)." At the same time, the
DOJ refined a set of procedural tools, making them capable of dealing
with sophisticated, cross-border criminal antitrust issues.
1. Procedural Tools
The cases against international cartels 12 were successful in part due
to the particular litigation teams, but also due to new procedural tools
developed to deal effectively with these kinds of long-term, sophisti-
cated, multi-national conspiracies. Some of those procedural innovations
are the Corporate Leniency Program, 13 the enactment of the International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 14 the entering into numerous Bi-
lateral Cooperation Agreements,' 5 and an increased willingness to apply
the Sherman Act 16 criminally to overseas conduct that has harmful ef-
fects within the United States.
11 1999 U.S.DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANwrrRusT DmSION, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (visited Apr.
18,2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atrlpubdocs.html>.
12 See infra Part I.A.2.
13 The policy is available at (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/publiel
guidelines/lencorp.htm> [hereinafter Corporate Leniency Program]. See also Gary R. Sprat-
ling, The Corporate Leniency Policy: Answers to Recurring Questions, Address at the ABA
Antitrust Section, 1998 Spring Meeting (Apr. 1, 1998) (transcript available at <http:ll
www.usdoj.gov/atr/publlc/speeches/1626.htm>) (visited Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Spratling,
1998 Corporate Leniency Speech].
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212 (1999).
15 The U.S. has entered into newer bilateral cooperation agreements with Germany
(1976), Australia (1982), the European Community (1991), Canada (1995), Israel (1999), Ja-
pan (1999), and Brazil (1999). These agreements are reprinted at 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) f
13,501-508.
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1999).
66 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
The Corporate Leniency Program is a way of getting information
about activities whose participants are, of course, strongly motivated to
keep secret. Under the leniency program, a company and its officers
may qualify for protection from criminal prosecution if they voluntarily
report their involvement in a crime and satisfy certain other criteria. 17
Under prior administrations, the program was limited to situations where
the defendant identified criminal conduct unknown to the Antitrust Divi-
sion. The Antitrust Division expanded the policy in 1993 to include situ-
ations where an investigation had already begun.' 8 The results were
dramatic. Amnesty applications increased from one a year to over 20 a
year.19
The Corporate Leniency Program is particularly important in an in-
ternational antitrust context where other enforcement resources are more
difficult to utilize, in part because service of process and discovery are
much more difficult outside of the country. The key points about the
leniency program are that it applies only to the first firm to report the
violation and cooperate with the investigation, and that disclosure of a
previously undiscovered cartel can be used to mitigate the penalties pos-
sible in some other matter for which the company is already being inves-
tigated.20 These factors tend to create a "prisoner's dilemma," or a race
to confess. As observed in an article in Forbes, "[i]f someone in your
company has been conspiring with competitors to fix prices, here's some
sound advice. Get to the Justice Department before your co-conspirators
do. Confess and the U.S. Department of Justice will let you off the hook.
But Hurry! Only one conspirator per cartel."'2 ' Almost all of the Divi-
sion's major cartel cases, including the vitamin cases, have been ad-
vanced by the cooperation of a Corporate Leniency applicant. 22
Another procedural innovation pushed forward by the Clinton Ad-
ministration is the use of international cooperation agreements, which
provide for the sharing of normally nonpublic data.23 The effectiveness
17 See Corporate Leniency Program, supra note 13.
18 See id.
19 See Gary R. Spratling, Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse: The Anti-
trust Division's Corporate Leniency Program-an Update, Address at the Bar Association of the
District of Columbia's 351 Annual Symposium on Associations and Antitrust (Feb. 16, 1999)
(transcript available at <http:lwww.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2247old.htm>) (visited Mar.
24, 2000) [hereinafter Spratling, 1999 Corporate Leniency Speech].
20 See id.
21 Janet Novak, Fix and Tell, FoRBES May 4, 1998 at 46.
22 James M. Griffin, An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of
International Cartels, Address before the American Bar Ass'n, Section of Antitrust Law, 48'
Annual Spring Meeting, Washington D.C. (Apr. 6, 2000) (transcript available at <http:l
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4489.htm>) (visited Apr. 18, 2000).
23 For a discussion of the various kinds of international cooperation agreements, see John
J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation Among Antiturst Authorities, Remarks before the IBC UK
Conferences Sixth Annual London Conference on EC Competition Law, London, England
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of the agreements in combating cross-border cartels is illustrated by the
joint investigation by U.S. and Canadian authorities into a price-fixing
conspiracy involving thermofax paper. Although Canadian authorities
first uncovered the offense, they sought the cooperation of the Antitrust
Division because much of the actual anticompetitive activity occurred in
the United States. In 1995, after two years of investigation, the two
countries brought criminal charges under their respective laws. They
concluded that prices to North American consumers had been increased
by approximately 10 percent 24 and were mostly imposed on businesses
and home fax users. Charges were filed against a Japanese corporation,
two American subsidiaries of a Japanese company, and a former presi-
dent of one of the subsidiaries. 25 The defendants pled guilty and agreed
to pay criminal fines of more than $6 million;26 the Canadian antitrust
authorities secured fines of nearly $3.45 million.27
Finally, a third procedural change consists of achieving greater legal
clarity on the way authorities will apply American criminal antitrust laws
to overseas conduct that has a concrete and harmful effect within the
United States. An important clarification in this respect was achieved in
the course of the thermofax paper case. A district court had originally
dismissed the indictment against one of the defendants, holding that its
alleged activities in furtherance of the conspiracy all occurred outside the
United States.28 The Division appealed this decision, asserting that the
location of the particular activity had no direct bearing on the anticompe-
titive effects on American consumers and that the Sherman Act should
generally extend to whatever criminal activities have a significant impact
on the U.S. market.29 The Division was successful in this argument and
the First Circuit reversed the district court.30 In so doing, the Circuit
Court observed that in today's economy, prohibiting prosecution of ex-
traterritorial actions that have "an intended and substantial effect" in the
U.S. would "create perverse incentives for those who would use nefari-
ous means to influence markets in the United States."''a
(May 19, 1999) (transcript available at <http:lwww.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ibc99059911up-
date.htm>) (visited Apr. 18, 2000).
24 See Department of Justice, Press Release, Northeast Fax Paper Importer Charged in
Justice Department's Ongoing Investigation of International Price Fixing, May 9, 1995 (vis-
ited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publiclpressreleases/1995/260.at>.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See Canadian Competition Bureau, Press Release, Mitsubishi Paper Mills Ltd. Pleads
Guilty, Feb. 17, 1997 (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ctOlO41e.html>.
28 See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F.Supp. 55, 65-66 (D.Mass. 1996).
29 See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1t Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
30 See id.
31 See id. at 4, 8. A trial on the merits resulted in a directed verdict for the defendants,
62 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.Mass. 1999).
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2. International Cartels
The Clinton Administration also refocused criminal enforcement
away from local conspiracies toward international cartels. In the four
years from FY 1987-1990, the Antitrust Division did not bring any cases
against foreign corporations.32 In FY 1991, only 1 percent of the corpo-
rate defendants were foreign-based.3 3 By comparison, in FY 1997, 32
percent of the corporate defendants were foreign-based, and in FY 1998,
roughly 50 percent were foreign-based.3 4
The pattern of current investigations suggests that future enforce-
ment actions will continue to have a strong international flavor. In 1999,
over 35 sitting grand juries were looking into suspected international car-
tel activity. 35 The companies subject to the Division's investigations are
located on five continents and in over 20 different countries. 36 Indeed,
the illegal activities themselves may have been even more widespread
than that, since investigations have uncovered cartel meetings in over
100 cities in 35 countries, including most countries of Europe and the Far
East.37
32 See Gary Spratling, International Cartel Prosecutions: Antitrust Division Policies Re-
lating to Plea Agreements in International Cases, Remarks Before the National Institute on
White Collar Crime, 27 (Mar. 4, 1999) (transcript available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pub-
lic/speeches/2275.htm>) (visited Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Spratling, White Collar Crime].
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See Gary R. Spratling, International Cartels: The Intersections Between FCPA Viola-
tions and Antitrust Violations, Remarks Before the American Conference Institute's 71 Annual
National Conference on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Dec. 9, 1999) (transcript available at
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/publlc/speeches/3981.htm>) (visited Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter
Spratling, International Cartels].
36 See id.
37 See id The Antitrust Division estimates that the cartels it has prosecuted since the
beginning of FY 1997 have affected over $10 billion in U.S. commerce and have cost Ameri-
can businesses and consumers many hundreds of millions of dollars annually. See Spratling,
White Collar Crime, supra note 32, at 27. Some of the most significant cartel investigations
have involved vital products such as citric acid, lysine, sodium gluconate (an industrial
cleaner), and graphite electrodes (used in steel making). See Spratling, International Cartels,
supra note 35. See also infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. As the current Assistant
Attorney General Joel Klein has observed, "[i]ntemational cartels typically pose an even
greater threat to American business and consumers than do domestic conspiracies because they
tend to be extremely broad in geographic scope and amount of commerce affected, as well as
highly sophisticated, characterized by precise elaborate agreements among the conspira-
tors ... " Testimony Before the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Mar. 22, 2000 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:/I
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/4381.htm>.
The Antitrust Division's increased focus on large foreign cartels has led to a striking
increase in the amount of criminal fines assessed. Prior to FY 1997, the highest amount of
fines obtained in any year was about $42 million. See Spratling, White Collar Crime, supra
note 32, at 27. In FY 1997 the Division eclipsed that mark by collecting fines of $205 million-
nearly five times more than any previous year in the Division's history. See id. Fines in-
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The pattern of recent cartel enforcement can be seen in an examina-
tion of four recent rounds of cases - those involving lysine, citric acid,
sorbates, and vitamins. In those four investigations, the DOJ found over
fourteen companies (including Hoffman-LaRoche, twice) and six indi-
viduals from four countries guilty.38 The Division collected nearly $1.2
billion in fines, 39 including a fine of $100 million imposed on Archer-
Daniels-Midland Company.n° The prosecution of the individual defend-
ants was a most important feature of this cases. 41 The prosecution estab-
lished the key deterrent concept, perhaps underemphasized in prior
administrations, that individuals who commit sophisticated white-collar
crimes such as antitrust violations will also face the prospect of serving
real jail time.42
A sorbate cartel investigation involved a class of chemical preserva-
tives used in high moisture foods such as cheese and baked goods. As of
July 1999, Eastman Chemical Co. of the United States, Hoechst of Ger-
many, and Nippon Gohsei of Japan each pled guilty to fixing sorbate
prices and allocating markets for over seventeen years.43 This rebuts the
commonly held notion that cartels tend to fall apart relatively quickly,
and suggests instead that they can be quite enduring if they are free to
organize and police themselves from overseas sanctuaries. This under-
scores, of course, the importance of enforcement efforts against multi-
national collusion.
The most recent cartel prosecution is also the one that has resulted
in the largest penalties. Collusion in the vitamin industry raised con-
sumer prices for common nutritional supplements such as vitamins A,
creased again in the following year, to over $265 million. See id. And in FY 1999, fines
reached $1.1 billion. See Spratling, International Cartels, supra note 35.
Similarly, average corporate fines have increased, from a little under $320,000 in FY
1991 to about $ 12 million in FY 1998, an increase of approximately forty fold. See Spratling,
White Collar Crime, supra note 32, at 27. Top-end fines have similarly increased, from $2
million, which six years ago was the largest fine ever imposed for a single Sherman Act
violation to $500 million assessed against Hoffman-La Roche in May of 1999. See Spratling,
International Cartels, supra note 35. Strildngly, of the roughly $470 million in fines obtained
in FY 1997-1998, nearly $440 million, or more than 90 percent of the total, was in connection
with multinational cartel activity. See Spratling, White Collar Crime, supra note 32, at 27.
38 See 1999 DOJ ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See Department of Justice, Press Release, Former Top ADM Executives, Japanese
Executive, Indicted in Lysine Price Fixing Conspiracy, Dec. 3, 1996 (visited Mar. 24, 2000)
<http:lwww.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressjreleases/1996/573at.htn>.
42 ADM executives are serving between 24 and 30 months of jail time for their involve-
ment in the lysine cartel. See United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1999 U.S.Dist. LEXIS
11166, at *46-*50 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1999).
43 See Department of Justice, Press Release, Japanese Chemical Company Third to be
Charged in 17-Year International Price Fixing Conspiracy, July 14, 1999 (visited Mar. 24,
2000) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/1999/2560.htm>.
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B2, beta carotene, and vitamin premixes that are used to enrich breakfast
cereals and many other processed foods. The Swiss pharmaceutical giant
F. Hoffman-La Roche pled guilty and paid a fine of $ 500 million for
leading a worldwide conspiracy to fix prices and to allocate markets.44
Attorney General Reno noted that this was not only a record fine in an
antitrust case, "but it is the largest fine the Justice Department has ever
obtained in any criminal case."4 5 The German firm, BASF, pled guilty
and paid a fine of $ 225 million.46 More recently, in September 1999,
three Japanese firms pled guilty and paid fines totaling $137 million. 47
Equally important, individual foreign executives were also prosecuted,
agreeing to pay six-figure fines and to serve substantial U.S. prison terms
of three or five months.4
B. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Mergers have dominated civil antitrust enforcement during the past
seven years.49 Some of the largest mergers in U.S. history are currently
being evaluated by federal antitrust enforcers, mergers that impact mil-
lions of consumers and the products they purchase on a daily basis.
Compared with a decade earlier, the agencies have challenged more
mergers in the 1990s than they did in the 1980s. The following two
tables shows FTC merger enforcement actions during the periods of FY
1983-88 and FY 1993-98.50
44 See Department of Justice, Press Release, F.Hoffinan-LaRoche and BASF Agree to
Pay Record Criminal Fines for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel, May 20, 1999
(visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/1999/2450.htm>.
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 See Department of Justice, Press Release, Three Japanese Companies Agree to Plead
Guilty, Pay Criminal Fines, for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel, Sept. 9, 1999
(visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.usdoj.govlatrpubliclpress-releases/199913659.htm>.
48 The court, however, retains the ultimate authority to determine the sentence to be
imposed under the sentencing guidelines, and to determine whether to accept any proposed
plea arrangements. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1995).
49 The number of mergers reported to the FTC and the Department of Justice under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1999), has almost tripled since the
beginning of the Clinton Administration: from 1,846 transactions in FY 1993, to an incredible
4,728 transactions in FY 1998. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS (1998) (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://www.ftc.govlbclhsr/98annrptlhsr98annual.htm>.
Fiscal Year 1999 filings closely approximate FY 1998 record pace. See Richard G. Parker,
Report from the Bureau of Competition, Prepared Remarks before the American Bar Ass'n,
Spring Meeting, Washington, D.C, Apr. 7, 2000 (transcript available at <http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/other/rparkerspingabaOO.htm>) (visited Apr. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Parker, Report].
Equally important is that the value of transactions has increased in more than seven times from
about $200 million in fiscal year 1993 to over $1.436 billion in fiscal year 1998. See id.
50 The information for these tables was compiled from the respective years of the Federal
Trade Commission's Annual Reports.
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FTC MERGER ENFORCEMENT, FY 1983-88
Fiscal Year Transactions Filed Enforcement Actions Ratio (E/T)
1983 1093 4 .0036
1984 1340 9 .0067
1985 1603 13 .0081
1986 1949 7 .0036
1987 2533 12 .0047
1988 2746 23 .0084
FTC MERGER ENFORCEMENT, FY 1993-99
Fiscal Year Transactions Filed Enforcement Actions Ratio (E/T)
1993 1589 21 .0132
1994 1846 28 .0152
1995 2305 43 .0186
1996 2816 27 .0096
1997 3702 27 .0073
1998 4728 33 .0070
1999 4642 30 .0065
The mere number of enforcement actions does not fully depict the
differences in enforcement. Many transactions challenged during the
1980s involved relatively small markets, or small transactions. The cases
challenged in the last seven years include some of the largest mergers in
history, including Staples/Office Depot, Lockheed/Martin Marietta, and
SBC/Ameritech.
The general increase in absolute numbers of enforcement actions is
attributable in part to the increase in merger activity. But there has also
been a general increase in the relative frequency of enforcement actions
during the 1990s compared to the 1980s. These distinct changes in
merger enforcement since the 1980s can be attributed to the fact that the
Merger Guidelines5' have been applied with greater confidence in their
analytical value and consumer benefit. The following discussion focuses
on a number of important developments in merger enforcement during
the past seven years. The six areas with the most significant changes are
(1) the use of unilateral effects analysis, (2) innovation markets, (3) net-
work mergers, (4) vertical mergers, (5) potential competition analysis,
and (6) efficiency analysis.
51 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 1992 Ho~zoNTAL
MERGER GUIDELnES, § 2.21 (1992) reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 [hereinaf-
ter 1992 HoRizoNTAL MERGER GUmELNES].
72 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
1. Unilateral Effects Analysis in Mergers
Merger enforcement in the past several years has devoted increased
attention to the unilateral effects analysis52 because of the potential for a
firm resulting from the merger to act unilaterally to reduce output and
raise price. For example, if firms sell differentiated products or are spa-
tially dispersed, individual sellers compete more directly with some ri-
vals than with others, and a merger of firms selling particularly close
substitutes may enable this merged firm to exercise some degree of mar-
ket power unilaterally. While the concept is not new - it was recognized
in the 1982 Merger Guidelines53 - the increased attention to it in recent
enforcement actions is significant. This renewed attention can be attrib-
uted to two developments. First, the advances in the theoretical literature
provide a better understanding of how unilateral effects arise.5 4 In addi-
tion, the advances enable the agencies to model unilateral effects more
precisely. Second, there is a greater availability of data, such as those
derived from point-of-sale scanners, that provide insight into the prod-
ucts that consumers regard as close substitutes, and that exercise a partic-
ularly significant constraint on each other's prices.55
The concept of unilateral effects is perhaps best illustrated by the
FTC's challenge of the proposed merger of Staples, Inc. and Office De-
pot, two of the three leading office supply superstore chains in the United
States.56 The two firms together operated about 1,000 superstores and
competed head-to-head in numerous metropolitan areas across the coun-
try. In 15 major metropolitan areas, including Washington, D.C., Balti-
more, San Diego and Tampa-St. Petersburg, Staples and Office Depot
were the only superstores, and in 27 other metropolitan areas, the two
firms had only one other superstore competitor, Office Max.57 The
merger also would have eliminated significant future competition be-
52 Anticompetitive effects from mergers may occur in two ways. Either the remaining
firms in the relevant market are so few that their incentives and their ability to collude are
enhanced, or the merged firm will be so dominant that it can unilaterally increase prices or
reduce output or innovation. See id.
53 See 1982 MERGER Gumm.mzs, supra note 5, at § M.C.I(c) ("Where products in a
relevant market are differentiated or sellers are spatially dispersed, individual sellers usually
compete more directly with some rivals than with others.... If the products or plants of the
merging firms are particularly good substitutes for one another, the Department is more likely
to challenge the merger"). Similar language is contained in the 1992 HomizoNrAL MERGER
GuiDwos, supra note 51.
54 See Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis,
11 ANrrrusT, Spring 1997, at 21.
55 See id.
56 See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
57 See Robert Pitofsky, An Overview of Antitrust Enforcement, Prepared Statement
Before House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary (Nov. 5, 1997) (visited Mar. 24,
2000) <http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/1997/9711/oversigh.htm> [hereinafter Pitofsky, Antitrust
Enforcement].
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tween the two firms in areas where one of them was planning to enter the
other's territory. However, it was far from obvious at the outset that the
merger would pose competitive problems, because the products sold by
Staples and Office Depot were available in numerous other stores. The
issue was whether those alternative sources would be an effective con-
straint on post-merger price increases in localities where Staples and Of-
fice Depot competed head-to-head.
The evidence revealed that no other stores offered the same combi-
nation of price, convenience, and other attributes as these two firms.
Moreover, the pricing evidence showed that in localities where Staples
and Office Depot competed head-to-head, their prices were significantly
lower than in localities where only one of the firms was present.5 8 In
markets where Staples and Office Depot did not compete, the other re-
tailers did not supply the level of price competition that existed between
two or more superstores. 59 That evidence demonstrated that those other
retailers of office supplies would not prevent Staples from increasing
prices in markets where competition from Office Depot was eliminated.
The evidence thus showed that Staples and Office Depot were particu-
larly close substitutes in a market with numerous and diverse types of
office supply retailers.60
The FTC's case argued both a narrow office supplies market, in
which the transaction would result in a merger-to-monopoly in many cit-
ies, and unilateral effects within a broader market. The district court
found a narrow market consisting of office supply superstores, using both
the 5-10% test of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines61 and the
Supreme Court's multi-faceted market definition approach of'Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States62 and its progeny. While Brown Shoe em-
ployed the Court's multi-faceted approach to analyze "submarkets", 63 the
court in Staples used the Brown Shoe market definition approach 64 to
assess the nature and extent of the competitive relationship between the
58 See Staples, 970 F.Supp. at 1075-78.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 1076 n.8 (referring to the 1992 HoRuzoNTA MERGER GUmELNES, supra
note 51).
62 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (stating that, "[t]he outer boundaries of a product market are
determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use [by consumers] or their cross-elasticity
of demand between the product itself and substitute for it.")
63 See id. Economists criticize the submarket approach, noting that any submarket also
meets the test as a market and should be recognized as such. Even though Brown Shoe used
the submarket approach, now out of favor, it remains the seminal case in the relevant market
analysis since, after all, a submarket is really a market.
64 See Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1074.
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merging parties' products and compare that to the competition they face
from other firms.65
Much of the FTC's merger enforcement during the past several
years has applied a unilateral effects theory. While skeptics of the ap-
proach may contend that it is simply an attempt to derive narrower mar-
kets and higher concentration levels, that is hardly the case. In many
respects, in the presence of apparent demand-side alternatives, it can be
more difficult to show that two products are particularly close substitutes,
than it would be to establish a broader product market. The analysis is
intensely fact-based. Despite its complexities, the unilateral effects anal-
ysis is an important part of merger analysis, and careful application of
the theory can yield significant benefits for consumers. The FTC's en-
forcement action in Staples, for example, saved consumers an estimated
$1.1 billion over five years. 66
2. Innovation Markets
Antitrust enforcement in recent years also has paid closer attention
to mergers that substantially threaten to reduce competition in the area of
research and development. Innovation has long been recognized as a
major source of welfare gains.67 The introduction of "innovation mar-
kets"68 to merger analysis reflects an increased appreciation that under
certain circumstances a substantial reduction in innovation rivalry
through a merger can be just as troublesome as the loss of other forms of
competition. The renewed focus on innovation and research and devel-
opment (R&D) competition is probably attributable to several factors.
First, the 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines69 drew attention to the
concept of innovation markets. Second, there has been a substantial
amount of recent merger activity in certain markets where antitrust en-
forcement may be particularly important in preserving R&D competition,
such as pharmaceuticals and defense. Third, there is an increased appre-
ciation of the importance of preserving incentives for strong rivalry in
the race to produce new and improved products in many key markets.
65 The court issued a preliminary injunction against the merger, Staples, 970 F. Supp. at
1093, and the parties then abandoned the transaction.
66 See Pitofsky, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 57.
67 See Thomas N. Dahdouh & James F. Mongoven, The Shape of Things to Come: Inno-
vation Market Analysis in Merger Cases, 64 Antitrust L.J. 405 (1996).
68 An innovation market "consists of the research and development directed to particular
new or improved processes, and the close substitutes for that research development." U.S.
DEPARTmENT oF JusncE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 1995 FEDERAL ANTITRUST
GuDLnEs FOR THE LIcmsNG OF INTELLEcrUAL PROPERTY, § 3.2.3 (1995), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,132 (1995) [hereinafter INTELLEcruAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES].
These guidelines are more readily accessible at (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:ll
www.usdoj.gov/atr/pubic/guidelines/ipguide.htm>.
69 Id.
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Research, development, and innovation, are critically important to both
the domestic and international competitiveness of U.S. firms. Moreover,
R&D competition is critically important not only for saving dollars in the
purchase of new products, but also for saving lives and ensuring our
national security.
The antitrust agencies have intervened in innovation market transac-
tions under very narrow circumstances - namely, where only a few firms
possess the specialized assets or characteristics needed to compete suc-
cessfully in the market, or where a merger is likely to result in a substan-
tial loss of R&D competition. Two cases illustrate the point, Ciba-Geigy
Ltd.,70 and United States v. Lockheed Martin /Northrop Grumman.71
In the 1997 Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz case, the FTC challenged a $63 bil-
lion merger of two pharmaceutical giants that threatened to produce a
monopoly in key technologies used in the development of gene therapy
products, which show substantial promise for the treatment of various
cancers and other medical conditions.72 The pool of potential competi-
tors was very limited because the merging firms controlled critical pat-
ents. The merger therefore would have diminished both the incentives
and the ability of other firms to develop competing products.73 Because
of the patent portfolios of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, competitors would be
blocked from commercial development. The case was resolved with a
consent order that preserved competition in this important innovation
market, in part by requiring the licensing of certain technology and pat-
ent rights to a third firm (Rhone-Poulenc Rorer) so that it would be in a
position to compete with the merged firm.74 According to Business
70 123 F.T.C. 842 (Mar. 24, 1997). The first innovation market case was General Mo-
tors. See United States v. General Motors Corp., No. 93-530 (D. Del filed Nov. 16, 1993)
(consent judgment). This 1993 case was the first application of the current innovation market
approach by the Department of Justice. The DOJ opposed the merger of the Allison Transmis-
sion Division of General Motors and ZF Friedrichshafen, AG, essentially the world's only
manufacturers and innovators of medium and heavy automatic transmissions for trucks, buses,
and other commercial and military vehicles. The complaint alleged that the GM-ZF combina-
tion would diminish competition not only in the production and sale of current products but
also in a worldwide innovation market for the technological design, development and produc-
tion of automatic transmissions for heavy vehicles. Other FTC cases alleging an innovation
market include American Home Products, 119 F.T.C 217 (Feb. 14, 1995) (involving merger
between two of three developers of rotavirus vaccines); Sensormatic Electronics Corp., 119
F.T.C. 520 (Apr. 18, 1995)(involving research and development of disposable labels for a new
type of electronic article surveillance system).
71 The complaint for this 1998 action is available at (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:ll
www.usdoj.gov/atrlcaseslfl600/1609.htm>. The transaction was subsequently abandoned
without public explanation. See Department of Justice, Press Release, (visited Mar. 24, 2000)
<http:lwww.usdoj.gov/atr/publiclpress_releases/1998/1830.htm>.
72 See 123 F.T.C. 842, at 8-9.
73 See id., at Complaint 31.
74 See id., at Order I IX.
76 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
Week, the FTC's enforcement action "shows a new savvy among trust-
busters about high-tech competition. '75
In Lockheed Martin / Northrop Grumman, the DOJ challenge to the
proposed acquisition of Northrop Grumman by Lockheed Martin was
based to a large extent on the loss of innovation competition in a number
of defense industry markets where Lockheed and Northrop were two of a
very few, and in several cases the only viable market participants. 76 The
DOJ considered the loss of innovation rivalry to be a particularly signifi-
cant consequence of the transaction, because a major focus of competi-
tion in these markets is the development of next-generation and leapfrog
technologies. 77 The transaction was ultimately abandoned by the parties.
3. Network Mergers
Another area of growing analytic increased importance in recent
years is the recognition of network effects in certain industries. Such
industries are characterized by products where the value of the product to
a user increases with the number of users. A common example is the
telephone network, which become more useful as the number of network
users increases. Like economies of scale, network effects generally ben-
efit consumers. However, the presence of network effects may also
mean that entry in a market is difficult, or that exclusionary conduct is
more likely to pay off, just as would be the case with more traditional
economies of scale. While network effects are not a new theory of com-
petitive harm, in recent years the antitrust agencies have been more atten-
tive to mergers in the network industries that may result in those kinds of
adverse effects.
In the 1980s, the antitrust enforcers took a very lax attitude toward
network mergers. They thought that entry into network markets would
be relatively easy since many networks consisted primarily of computers,
and replicating the back office aspects of networks 78 seemed relatively
75 A Booster Shot for Gene Therapy, Bus. WK., Jan. 20, 1997, at 92.
76 See United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., DOJ Complaint, at 2 (visited Mar. 24,
2000) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fl6O/1609.htm>. The complaint alleged that Lock-
heed would attain a monopoly position in airborne early warning radar, electro-optical missile
warning systems, directed infrared countermeasures systems, the SQQ-89 antisubmarine war-
fare combat system, and fiber-optic towed decoys. In the markets for high performance fixed-
wing military aircraft, on-board radio-frequency counter measures, stealth technology, and re-
mote mine-hunting systems, the acquisition would have reduced the number of competitors
from three to two. See id.
77 See Constance K. Robinson, Leap-Frog and Other Forms of Innovation, Address
before the American Bar Association (June 10, 1999) (transcript available at <http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2482.htm>) (visited Mar. 24, 2000).
78 Network support functions are usually "scalable," that is the back office functions can
support more and more products without much expansion. For instance, the billing and ac-
counting back office of an ATM network can be set up to support a wide range of ATM
machines.
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simple. For example, the regulators approved mergers of ATM networks
because they believed that entry into the back office operations was rela-
tively easy. However, that position was misguided because one key as-
pect of a network is its relationships with customers and suppliers, an
attribute that cannot be easily duplicated.79 Nor are computers necessar-
ily a defining characteristic of networks.
The more sensitive view of the potential effects of network mergers
is shown by the enforcement actions involving the Rite Aid/Revco
merger80 and the MCIWorldcomm merger.81 In the Rite Aid/Revco ac-
tion the FrC challenged the proposed merger of the two largest retail
pharmacy chains in the United States. The relevant market of concern
was the sale of pharmacy services to pharmacy benefit managers
("PBM") - entities that operate pharmacy benefit plans. PBMs buy re-
tail distribution services from pharmacies and sell them to health insur-
ance plans and employer groups. PBMs contract with chains and
independent pharmacies to organize a network of participating pharma-
cies. A PBM needs to have widespread geographic coverage to be credi-
ble to their customers - the insurance plans and employer groups. In
many markets, it would be feasible to obtain such geographic coverage
with either the Rite-Aid or Revco pharmacy chain serving as the
"anchor" to the network, possibly in combination with smaller chains or
independents, but obtaining wide coverage without either major chain
would be either impossible or extremely costly. Before the proposed
merger, the pharmacies of Rite-Aid and Revco competed to be the
anchor of these PBMs. If one firm priced its services too high, a PBM
could use the other chain in combination with other pharmacies. A
merger of Rite-Aid and Revco would eliminate that option and allow the
merged firm to extract much more favorable terms from the PBMs. In
turn, this would have had significant effects on the PBMs' ultimate cus-
tomers, the employees and other insured who depend upon their health
plans for affordable coverage of pharmaceuticals. 82 The FTC challenged
79 A prime example of this kind of error was the merger of the MAC and Cashstream
ATM networks, which was approved in 1988, but ultimately led to a Justice Department mo-
nopolization suit in .1994. See David A. Balto, The Murky World of Network Mergers:
Searching for the Opportunities for Network Competition, 42 Arrrmtusr BULLETIN 793, 803-
08 (1997).
80 No. 961 0020 (FTC, 1996). The FTC authorized the filing of a motion for preliminary
injunction on Apr. 17, 1996. See FTC, Press Release, FTC Will Seek to Block Rite AidlRevco
Merger (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/9604/riterevc.htm>.
81 In re MCI Communications Corp., FCC No. 98-225 (Sept. 14, 1998) (order) (visited
Apr. 27, 2000) <http:llwww.fcc.govlBureaus/CommonCarrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.txt>.
For a complete look at all materials related to the merger, see (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http:ll
www.fcc.gov/ccb/MergersfWorldcom/welcome.html>.
82 See Jonathan Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, Re-
marks before the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Orlando, Florida (Aug.
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this merger on the basis of network effects, and the proposed merger was
subsequently abandoned.8 3
The constant intellectual ferment in the computer industry has
spawned new industries that have themselves become important centers
of commerce in a short time period. The most important of these is the
Internet. Already, even in its infancy, it has become established as a
potentially huge market, and the efficacy of antitrust oversight at this
point may determine the level of competition in this industry for many
years to come. The most significant Internet antitrust enforcement action
to date was the Justice Department's investigation of the merger between
MCI and WorldCom, the two companies that together own over fifty
percent of the Internet backbone market.84
The Department's case centered around the relevant product market
and barriers to entry into the market. The market was defined as limited
to Internet backbone services - which is essentially the transmission of
traffic between all Internet users - because retail services were not effec-
tive substitutes. Internet transmission providers are dependent upon one
another for interconnection in order to offer consumers near universal
access to Internet service providers and customers. After the proposed
acquisition, MCI and WorldCom would have controlled the majority of
traffic, and would have had a substantially larger share than the next
largest Internet backbone provider. The combined firm would have en-
joyed significant network externalities, and would have leverage to dic-
tate the terms, conditions, and pricing of interconnection with other
Internet backbone providers. Smaller backbone providers, particularly
new entrants, would have been dependent on interconnection with MCI
in order to effectively compete. This asymmetric relationship would
have left small providers without any leverage and subject to whatever
terms and conditions MCI imposed. As a consequence, MCI would have
had the incentive, ability, and power to increase the costs to or degrade
the quality of interconnection for smaller rivals, and once it did, entry
barriers would have been solidified.
6, 1996) (transcript available at <http:/www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/unilat6l.htm>) (visited
Apr. 27, 2000).
83 See FTC, Press Release, FTC Will Seek to Block Rite Aid/Revco Merger (visited Mar.
24, 2000) <http:/lwww.ftc.govlopa/19969604/riterevc.htm>; FTC, Press Release, Rite Aid
Abandons Proposed Acquisition of Revco After FTC Sought to Block Transaction (Apr. 24,
1996) (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.govlopa/1996/9604ritenogo.htm>.
84 See Constance K. Robinson, Network Effects in Telecommunications Mergers, MCI
WorldCom Merger: Protecting the Future of the Internet, Remarks before the Practicing Law
Institute, San Francisco, CA (Aug. 23, 1999) (transcript available at < http://www.usdoj.gov
atr/public/speeches/3889.htm>) (visited Apr. 27, 2000).
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The settlement8 5 required MCI to sell Internet MCI to Cable &
Wireless plc of Great Britain for an estimated $1.75 billion, making it the
largest divestiture of a company in merger history.8 6
4. Revitalization of Vertical Merger Enforcement
Scrutiny of vertical mergers 87 experienced a renewal in the 1990s
after a decade in which the government did not bring a single case. Ac-
cording to economic theories, some vertical mergers can be harmful to
competition88 even though most vertical mergers generally are either
procompetitive or at least competitively neutral. However, the revival of
vertical merger enforcement is not a return to the often-criticized foreclo-
sure theories that prevailed in the 1960s and early 1970s. The cases in
that period tended to focus on loss of business opportunities for non-
integrated firms, and the loss of even a relatively small share of the mar-
ket was considered harmful.89 In contrast, current vertical merger en-
forcement evaluates whether a transaction will enable the merged firm to
harm competition, rather than competitors, through various kinds of stra-
tegic behavior.90
Recent vertical merger enforcement has focused on several theories.
One theory is that a merged firm with substantial control over an impor-
tant input into the upstream or downstream market, will be able to harm
competition by substantially impeding its rivals' market access at either
the upstream or downstream levels. A related theory is that the merged
firm, again, with substantial control over an important input into the up-
stream or downstream market, will be able to harm competition by rais-
ing its upstream or downstream rivals' costs of doing business. Both of
these situations involve a vertical merger that threatens to create or
85 See In re MCI Communications Corp., FCC No. 98-225, 227 (Sept. 14, 1998) (or-
der) (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http:llwww.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrierlOrdersl1998/
fcc98225.txt>.
86 See id.
87 See supra note 7.
88 See, e.g., Michael Riordan & Steven Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-
Chicago Approach, 63 AN~rrrusT L.J. 513, 515, 527-64 (1995); Thomas Krattenmaker &
Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over
Price,. 96 YALE L... 209, 228 (1986).
89 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-30, 334 (1962).
90 See M. Howard Morse, Vertical Mergers: Recent Learning, 53 Bus. LAW, 1217; Rob-
ert Pitofsky, Vertical Restraints and Vertical Aspects of Mergers - A U.S. Perspective, Re-
marks before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 24' Annual Conference on International
Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 16, 1997) (transcript available at < http://www.ftc.govl
speeches/pitofsky/fordham7.htm>) (visited Apr. 27, 2000); Richard G. Parker, Trends in
Merger Enforcement and Litigation, Remarks before Briefing for Corporate Counsel, Wash-
ington, D.C. Sept. 16, 1998) (transcript available at <http:llwww.ftc.gov/speeches/other/
parker.htm>) (visited Apr. 27, 2000).
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tighten a potential bottleneck somewhere in the chain of production or
distribution.
Consider a firm at the upstream level that sells a product to a down-
stream firm, which in turn adds value through manufacturing or services,
and sells its product to the ultimate consumer or user. A bottleneck
transaction can have adverse effects at two levels. First, the acquisition
can worsen competitive conditions at the downstream level by raising the
costs of inputs for competitive rivals or by blocking potential entry - the
force that we often rely on to keep markets competitive. Thus, the trans-
action can create or increase market power in the downstream merger
partner through its control of inputs to competitors or potential competi-
tors. Second, a bottleneck acquisition can disadvantage competitors or
potential competitors at the upstream level, by impeding their access to
customers at the downstream level. Therefore, the vertical merger may
enable the parties at either downstream and upstream levels to increase
their market power and protect their turf against new competitors. Third,
competitive harms can result when a vertically integrated firm acts as
both a supplier to, and competitor of, certain firms. The harm emerges
when the merged firm, for competitive purposes, misuses commercially
sensitive information that it obtains during its course of dealings with
customers who are also its competitors at the downstream level.91 Cases
such as Time Warner Inc.,92 and Merck & Co, Inc.,93 illustrate the appli-
cation of these theories. 94 As suggested by the length of the discussion,
these tend to be complex cases.
a. Time Warner
Time Warner Inc.'s acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System raised
concerns regarding bottleneck foreclosure and raising rivals' costs. The
transaction involved three major firms in the cable television industry
creating the nation's largest media company. Time Warner is a major
producer of video programming for cable distribution, including the pop-
ular channels, HBO and Cinemax, as well as a major cable systems oper-
ator through Time Warner Entertainment, a joint venture with U.S. West.
91 It is not uncommon in vertically integrated companies for one part of the firm to have
a business relationship with a customer (or other entity) that is a competitor of a downstream
(or upstream) business within the integrated firm. The nature of that business relationship may
require access to some competitively sensitive information that the third party would not want
to be released to competitors.
92 No. C-3709, 1997 FTC LEXIS 13, at *1 (FrC, Feb. 3, 1997).
93 No. C-3853, 1999 FrC LEXIS 18, at *1 (FrC., Feb. 18, 1999).
94 See also In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 128 F.T.C. 928 (Nov. 14, 1995) (involving ac-
cess into the highly specialized entertainment industry's graphics software market); In re
PacifiCorp, No. 971-0091, 1998 F.T.C. 17 (Feb. 18, 1998) (merger between a generator of
electricity and a supplier of coal to generating plants would result in increased wholesale and
retail electricity costs).
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Turner Broadcasting, an owner of CNN, TNT and TBS, is another major
producer of video programming. TeleCommunications, Inc. (TCI), the
nation's largest cable systems operator, was involved through a substan-
tial stock interest in Turner, which would have been converted to a sig-
nificant stock interest in Time Warner.95 The proposed transaction
would have substantially increased the level of vertical integration in the
industry. At the programming production level, the transaction would
have combined two of the leading producers of video programming sold
to multi-channel distributors such as cable systems. Together, Time
Warner and Turner accounted for about 40% of all video programming
sold to multichannel distributors in the United States.96 At the multi-
channel distribution level, the transaction would link Time Warner's
cable operation, which was already the second largest distributor of cable
television in the United States, and TCI, which had a substantial minority
interest in Turner that would be converted into an interest in Time
Warner after the merger. The acquisition would add to the existing verti-
cal integration by completely integrating Turner's video programming
business with Time Warner's cable distribution business, and by creating
a link, by ownership and by contract, between Time Warner's program-
ming business and TCI's cable distribution business. 97
The FTC found that this merger was likely to restrict access to both
video programming for firms that distribute multi-channel video pro-
gramming to households and other subscribers, and to producers of video
programming who depend on multi-channel distribution. 98 Such restric-
tions could have been imposed not only in absolute terms, but also in
terms of the relative cost of access among competing firms.
95 TCI operates in about 27% of all cable television households. See FTC Complaint, at
32, No. C-3709 (Feb. 7, 1997) (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/19969609/
twcmplt.htm>.
96 See In re Time Warner, No. C-3709, 1997 FTC LEXIS 13, at *14.
97 See id. at *17-*19. The latter would happen because TCI and its subsidiary Liberty
Media had a 24% interest in Turner Broadcasting that would be converted to a 7.5% fully
diluted equity interest in Time Warner, and TCI would have a right of first refusal to acquire
the 7.4% interest in Time Warner that Ted Turner would receive as part of the deal. Thus, TCI
potentially could own 15% of Time Warner, and more if it chose to make additional purchases
of the stock. See id. at * 10-* 11. In addition, as another part of the deal, TCI would enter into
a mandatory carriage agreement (the "Programming Service Agreement") with Time Warner,
which would require TCI to carry four of Turners top cable channels for 20 years, but at
preferential prices. See id. at *11-*12.
98 Similar concerns, involving different markets, lead to the Commission's earlier chal-
lenge of the proposed acquisition of Paramount Communications, a large movie maker, by a
group of companies involved in video programming and distribution, including QVC Network,
Inc. ("QVC"), Liberty Media Corporation ("LMC") (collectively, the "QVC group"), and
Tele-Communications Inc. ("TCr'). See In re Tele-Communications, Inc., No.941-0008, 1993
FTC LEXIS 318, at *1 (FrC, Nov. 11, 1993). QVC was ultimately unsuccessful in its bid for
Paramount, therefore, the consent agreement was not finalized.
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The acquisition would make it more difficult for other producers of
video programming to gain access to the distribution market because
Time Warner and TCI, through its financial interest in Time Warner,
would have a natural inclination to favor their own programming over a
competitor's. Since Time Warner and TCI together controlled around
41% of the distribution market, a competing video programmer would
find it difficult to achieve profitable distribution.99 In addition, it would
have been difficult for a competitor to have a financially viable network
that could offer meaningful competition to Time Warner and Turner, es-
pecially with network programming services that have high sunk costs,
such as news channels. 1°°
Access to video programming was also a concern because Time
Warner and TCI could block entry into their distribution markets or raise
their rivals' costs through their control of a large portion of video pro-
gramming. Time Warner and Turner accounted for over 40% of the
video programming in the United States, including several popular chan-
nels such as CNN, TNT and HBO. 1° 1 A potential entrant, such as a
telephone or utility company or a company that sees an opportunity to
overbuild10 2 a Time Warner or TCI market with another cable operation,
could have its entry impeded if it cannot gain access to those "must
have" channels at non-discriminatory prices. Likewise, an existing com-
petitor such as a direct satellite broadcast service could have its input
costs raised above competitive levels. Moreover, even in markets where
Time Warner and TCI do not have cable operations, the horizontal com-
bination of the Time Warner and Turner video programming businesses
would give Time Warner the power to raise prices unilaterally or condi-
tion the sale of marquee channels on the purchase of other channels that
the service provider may not want. 10 3 The FTC dealt with these concern
by imposing a number of conditions on the transaction that were
99 See In re Time Warner, FrC Complaint, No. C-3709 (Feb. 7, 1997) (visited Apr. 27,
2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/osl1996/9609/twcmplt.htm>.
1OO See In re Time Warner, No. C-3709, 1997 FTC LEXIS 13, at *15. Development of
alternative programming also would be discouraged by TCI's long-term carriage arrangement
with Time Warner. See i at *11-*12. That carriage agreement would lessen TCI's incen-
tives to sign up better or less expensive alternatives to the Time Warner programming than
those committed under contract. The mandatory carriage commitment also reduced TCI's
ability to carry alternative services, because current cable distribution is capacity-constrained
to a large extent. TCI might find it difficult to add new channels unless some existing pro-
gramming is dropped or additional capacity is added through new technology or higher-capac-
ity transmission lines.
101 See In re Time Warner, FTC Complaint, at 1 31, No. C-3709 (Feb. 7, 1997) (visited
Apr. 27, 2000) <http:/www.ftc.gov/os/1996/9609/twcmplt.htm>.
102 An overbuild is a situation in which two or more cable companies serve the same
geographic market.
103 See In re Time Warner, No. C-3709, 1997 FrC LEXIS 13, at *44-*45.
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designed to control the specific mechanism by which competitive harm
could occur.
b. Merck & Co., Inc.
This case involved the acquisition by Merck, a leading pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturer, of Medco, the nation's largest pharmacy benefits man-
ager ("PBM").' 0 4 As middlemen between pharmaceutical companies
and managed care plans, PBMs provide a variety of services including
sophisticated computerized claims processing, drug utilization review,
pharmacy network administration, mail- order prescription services and
formulary services that include aggressive rebate negotiation with manu-
facturers.105 A drug "formulary" is a list of drugs that PBMs give to
pharmacies, physicians, and third-party payers to guide them in prescrib-
ing and dispensing prescriptions to health plan beneficiaries. According
to the complaint outlining the Commission's charges, Medco negotiates
with pharmaceutical manufacturers, including Merck, concerning place-
ment of drugs on the Medco formulary. Medco also negotiates rebates,
discounts, and prices that Medco's PBMs pay for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. The FTC's investigation revealed that post-merger, Medco had
given favorable treatment to Merck drugs, and in some cases consumers
had been denied access to the drugs of competing manufacturers. 10 6 In
addition, the merger made it possible for Medco to disclose to Merck the
sensitive pricing information of Merck's competitors, thereby fostering
collusion among drug manufacturers. 107
The FTC's complaint charged that the acquisition of Medco by
Merck may result in exclusion of other manufacturer's products from
Medcos formularies; enhance the chances for collusion and other illegal
anticompetitive conduct; eliminate Medco as an independent negotiator
of pharmaceutical prices with manufacturers; reduce other manufactur-
ers' incentives to develop innovative pharmaceuticals; and increase the
prices and diminish the quality of the pharmaceuticals available to
consumers.
08
104 See In re Merck & Co., No. C-3853, 1999 FTC LEXIS 18, at *1 (FC., Feb. 18,
1999). For more information on PBMs, see also supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
For an earlier case of the same type involving Eli Lilly's acquisition of the PBM business of
McKesson Corporation, see In re Eli Lilly & Co., 130 F.T.C. 243 (1995).
105 See David A. Balto, A Whole New World?: Pharmaceutical Reforms to the Managed
Care Revolution, 52 FooD & DRUG L.J. 83 (1997).
106 See FTC, Press Release, Merck Settles FTC Charges that its Acquisition of Medco
Could Cause Higher Prices and Reduced Quality for Prescription Drugs, Aug. 27, 1998 (vis-
ited Apr. 27, 2000 ) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/opa/199819808/merck.htm>.
107 See In re Merck & Co., 1999 FTC LEXIS 18, at *5.
108 See id. The consent order against Merck requires Merck-Medco to maintain an "open
formulary" - one that includes drugs selected and approved by an independent Pharmacy and
Therapeutics ("P&T") Committee. See id at *11-*12. This committee consists of physicians
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A noteworthy observation is that many vertical mergers occur in
industries in which rapid changes are taking place. Ideally, rapid techno-
logical change will prevent a firm from exercising market power because
a new competitor with a new technology will soon take its place. Never-
theless, in some situations, a merger can create a roadblock to technolog-
ical change. A transaction creating a bottleneck may prevent a new
technology from reaching the market if a bottleneck cannot be easily
expanded or circumvented. For example, the FTC would not be con-
cerned about foreclosure of new entry if an entrant could easily enter at
either the upstream and downstream levels. 10 9 However, entry may not
be easy in some markets that have network characteristics, or if there is a
large installed base and it would be expensive for customers to switch to
a new product.
5. Potential Competition Mergers
Antitrust enforcement in the last several years has also rekindled
interest in mergers that may eliminate potential competition. For exam-
ple, potential competition could be eliminated where one of the merger
partners, but for the merger, likely would enter the market in competition
with the other partner and increase the competitive vigor of the market
(actual potential entry), or exercise a procompetitive influence from the
fringe even before it enters (perceived potential entry). Like vertical
merger theories, potential competition theories fell into disuse during
much of the 1980s. A major setback was the FTC's 1984 decision in
B.A.T. Industries, Ltd.,"l0 a case involving the actual potential entry the-
ory. In B.A.T., the majority of the Commission imposed a high burden of
proof to show that, but for the merger, the potential entrant would have
entered the market independently. The majority concluded that a reason-
able probability of entry was not enough and that "clear proof' that entry
would occur was required."' In that case, clear proof meant "concrete
plans" such as a capital acquisition plan or a budget drawn up with entry
and pharmacologists who have no financial interest in Merck. See id .at *12-*13. The con-
sent order would require that this P&T Committee independently make all decisions concern-
ing the inclusion and exclusion of drugs on the open formulary. See id. at *12. The order also
ensures that Medco will accept all discounts, rebates or other concessions offered by any other
manufacturer of pharmaceutical products in connection with the listing of those products on
the open formulary, and to accurately reflect such discounts in ranking the drugs on the formu-
lary. See id. at *14. Merck and Medco were also prohibited from sharing proprietary or other
non-public information they receive from one another's competitors such as prices with ex-
ceptions for attorneys and auditors. See id. at *16-*18. In addition, the consent order would
require Merck-Medco to make known the availability of the open formulary to anyone who
currently has a PBM agreement with Medco, and (for a period of five years) to prospective
customers. See id. at *17-*19.
109 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
110 104 FTC. 852 (1984).
111 See id. at CommissionOpinion, at 926.
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in mind.'1 2 The current Chairman of the FTC, Robert Pitofsky, has criti-
cized that standard:
I believe the "clear proof' standard is inappropriate and
in fact essentially guts the actual potential competition
doctrine. Section 7 only requires that the effect of the
transaction "may be" to lessen competition, and that has
been interpreted in the majority of litigated cases as re-
quiring only a reasonable probability. At a more practi-
cal level, it is precisely in the most anticompetitive of
conglomerate acquisitions that it is least likely that the
government or a private party would discover documents
assessing the prospects for entry other than by merger. I
would not impose a "clear proof' standard if a conglom-
erate merger were to come up today.113
The antitrust agencies have in fact challenged significant mergers
under potential competition theories in recent years, although none of the
cases have been litigated. There have been a number of such cases, how-
ever only Zeneca Group PLC,1 4 ABB, 115 and United States v. SBC Com-
munication's Inc.116 are highlighted here. 117
a. Zeneca/Astra.
Zeneca Group's proposed acquisition of Astra AB raised competi-
tive concerns over the loss of potential competition in a market for long-
lasting local anesthetics."18 Astra was the leading supplier of long-acting
local anesthetics and one of only two companies approved by the FDA
for the manufacture and sale of these kinds of drugs in the United States.
Although Zeneca was not yet in that market, prior to the acquisition it
had entered into an agreement with Chiroscience Group plc to market
and assist in the development of levobupivacaine, a new long-acting lo-
112 See id at 927-28.
113 Robert Pitofsky, Competition Policy In Communications Industries: New Antitrust
Approaches, Address before the Glasser LegalWorks Seminar on Competitive Policy in Com-
munications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 10, 1997) (tran-
script available at <http:lwww.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/newcomm.htn>) (visited Mar. 24,
2000) (citations omitted).
114 No. C-3880, 1999 FTC LEXIS 115, at *1 (FrC., June 7, 1999). For a more complete
discussion of potential competition mergers in the pharmaceutical industry, see David A. Balto
& James F. Mongoven, Antitrust Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Industry Mergers, 54 FOOD
& DRuG L. J. 255 (1999).
115 No. C-3867, 1999 FTC LEXIS 51, at *1 (FTC., April 22, 1999).
116 No. 99-0715, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16789, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1999).
117 See also In re Boston Scientific Corp., 119 FrC 549 (Apr. 28, 1996) (involving poten-
tial competition in the intravascular ultrasound (IVUS) imaging catheter market); FTC v.
Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
118 See Zeneca, No. C-3880, 1999 FrC LEXIS 115, at *5-*6.
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cal anesthetic being developed by Chiroscience. u 9 By virtue of its
agreement with Chiroscience, Zeneca was an actual potential competitor.
The U. S. market for these drugs is highly concentrated and barriers
to entry are high due to the need to undertake the difficult, expensive and
time-consuming process of researching and developing a new product,
obtaining FDA approval, and gaining customer acceptance.1 20 The Com-
mission alleged that the acquisition would result in the elimination of a
significant source of new competition, and the case was resolved with a
consent order.121
b. ABB-Elsag Bailey Process Automation N.V.
ABB's proposed acquisition of Elsag Bailey Process Automation
threatened to lessen competition in the market for process gas chro-
matographs and potential competition in the market for process mass
spectrometers. 122 ABB and Elsag were the world's two leading suppliers
of process gas chromatographs in a highly concentrated market, and
ABB would have had almost a 70% market share as a result of the acqui-
sition.' 23 The FTC's complaint alleged that the acquisition would have
enabled ABB to unilaterally exercise market power, which would have
resulted in higher prices and decrease of innovation in the market.' 24
ABB also was one of the world's leading suppliers in the highly concen-
trated market for process mass spectrometers. Elsag Bailey did not yet
manufacture process mass spectrometers, but it was involved in the re-
search and development of a process mass spectrometer that it planned to
begin manufacturing and selling in 1999. Thus, Elsag Bailey was an
actual potential competitor in the market for process mass spectrometers.
The FTC's complaint alleged that the acquisition would eliminate this
significant source of future product competition and innovation. 25 The
case was settled with a consent order that required ABB to divest the
Analytical Division of Elsag Bailey's Applied Automation, Inc. subsidi-
ary, that involved the manufacture and sale of process gas chro-
119 See id. at *1.
120 See id. at *5-*6.
121 See id. at *8.
122 See In re ABB, No. C-3867, 1999 FTC LEXIS 51, at *5-*6. Process gas chro-
matographs are analytical instruments used in process manufacturing applications to measure
the chemical composition of a gas or a liquid by separating a sample into its individual compo-
nents through selective chemical interaction or solubility, and measuring the separated compo-
nents using a detector. See id. at *1.
123 See FTC Complaint, at 13, No. C-3867, (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/
os/1999/9904/abbcmp.htm>.
124 See In re ABB, No. C-3867, 199 FTC LEXIS 51, at *5-*6.
125 See id.
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matographs and the research and development of process mass
spectrometers.126
c. SBC-Ameritech.
SBC's proposed acquisitions of Ameritech Corp. and Comcast Cel-
lular Corp. threatened to eliminate not only head-to-head competition in
seventeen local markets for wireless mobile telephone (cellular) services
but also potential competition in local exchange and long distance tele-
phone services in the St. Louis area. 127 SBC was the incumbant provider
of local exchange services in the area, and prior to the announcement of
the acquisition, Ameritech had planned to enter the area with competing
local exchange and long distance telephone services. Ameritech had
planned to bundle its new services with its existing cellular mobile tele-
phone service. 128 Because there was no existing source for such a bun-
dled product in the St. Louis area, Ameritech expected that its plan
would enhance its ability to retain cellular customers.' 29 The DOJ al-
leged that Ameritech had made extensive preparations for entry before it
agreed to be acquired by SBC. 130 Shortly after the announcement of its
planned acquisition by SBC, Ameritech decided not to implement its lo-
cal exchange and long distance entry plans in the St. Louis area.131 The
DOJ alleged that the acquisition would prevent the realization of this
new competition. 132 The case was settled with an agreement that re-
quired SBC and Ameritech to divest a cellular phone system in each of
the seventeen markets, and specifically the Ameritech cellular systems in
the St. Louis area. 133 The purpose of this aspect of the consent decree is
to ensure "that a purchaser of the divested Ameritech cellular systems in
the St. Louis area would have the ability to pursue a local exchange entry
strategy in SBC's local service area."' 134
126 See id. at *16.
127 See 64 Fed. Reg. 23,099,23,099 (April 21, 1999) (proposed final judgment and com-
petitive impact statement).
128 See id. at 23,107-108.
129 See id. at 23,108.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See United States v. SCB Communication's Inc., No. 99-0715, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16789, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1999).
133 See id.
134 See Department of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Requires SBC to Divest
Cellular Properties in Deal with Ameritech and Comcast, Mar. 23, 1999 (visited Mar. 24,
2000) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/1999/2322.htn>. See also United
States v. Signature Flight Support Corp., No.1:99CV00537 (D.D.C., filed Mar.1, 1997), 64
Fed. Reg. 14,785 (proposed final judgment and competitive impact statement). In Signature
Flight, the Department's complaint alleged that Signature Flight's acquisition of AMR Combs
Inc. would eliminate head-to-head competition between Signature Flight and AMR Combs in
providing flight support services such as fueling, ramp and hangar space rentals at two air-
ports. See id. at 14,764-765. The complaint also alleged loss of potential competition from
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Potential competition theory is an important part of merger enforce-
ment where, but for the merger, one of the merger partners is likely to
enter the market independently, the market is highly concentrated, and
barriers to entry are high. Effective enforcement at the merger stage can
preserve incentives to innovate, the potential for future entry, and prevent
the future exclusionary use of monopoly power.
6. Analysis of Merger Efficiencies
Since the mid-1990s, efficiency' 35 analysis has become a full-
fledged part of both merger review and litigation. While efficiencies
were addressed in the 1984 and 1992 Merger Guidelines,'136 and some
courts had begun to recognize merger efficiencies in the late 1980s and
early 1990s,' 37 for many years consideration of merger efficiencies was
largely a matter of prosecutorial discretion.' 38 A need to clarify the anal-
ysis of merger efficiencies emerged during the FfC's 1995 hearings on
competition policy in a global, high-tech marketplace.' 39 Shortly there-
after, a joint FTC-DOJ task force began a vigorous re-examination of the
issue. That effort culminated with a revision of the efficiencies section
of the 1992 Merger Guidelines in April, 1997.140
The 1997 Guidelines revisions accomplished several things. First
and most significantly, they tied efficiencies directly into competitive ef-
fects analysis. The revisions recognized that cost reductions might re-
Signature Flight at a third airport where Signature had agreed to become the operator of a
flight support facility upon its completion in the year 2000 in competition with AMR Combs.
See id.
135 Mergers may be efficient for a number of reasons. For instance, they may enable the
merged firms take advantage of economies of scale or scope to reduce costs per unit in produc-
tion, distribution or marketing. Those efficiencies may offset some of the anticompetition
potential of a particular merger. Efficiency analysis is designed to weigh those effects.
136 DEPARTMENT OF Jusncpa & FEDERAL TRADE CoIssIoN, 1984 MERGER GUIDE-
Lums, § 3.5, reprinted in 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 MERGER
GuDnEs]; 1992 HoRizoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at § 4.
137 See, e.g., FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 680 (D. Minn. 1990); United
States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 849 (W.D. Va.), affid, 892 F.2d 1042, 1084-
85 (4th Cir. 1989).
138 In fact, the Supreme Court stated in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. that, "[p]ossible
economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality." 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). However,
literal application of that ruling appears to be a relic of the past.
139 See Hearings Before the Federal Trade Commission on Global and Innovation.Based
Competition, (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/opp/global/GCI 13095.htm> [here-
inafter FTC Hearings]; Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report, Anticipating the 21" Cen-
tury: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace, Ch.2, (May 1996)
(visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/opp/globallreportlgc_.vl.pdf> [hereinafter FTC,
Staff Report].
140 DFPARTmEr OF JusncE & FEDERAL TRADE CoMussIoN, 1997 HomizoNTAL
MERGER Guinam.ns, § 4 (revised), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, at
20,573-11 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 HomzoNTAL MERGER GumuN-s].
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duce the likelihood of coordinated interaction or the incentive to raise
price unilaterally. 141 These are situations in which consumers are likely
to receive the benefits of merger efficiencies. The revised Guidelines
instruct that a merger will not be challenged if the efficiencies "are of a
character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticom-
petitive in any relevant market."'142 This is not simply a matter of com-
paring the magnitudes of the anticompetitive effects and the estimated
efficiencies. Rather, it is essential to determine how the claimed efficien-
cies will affect market behavior. Second, the revisions defined more
clearly and explicitly which efficiencies "count," i.e. what Section 4 now
defines as "cognizable efficiencies." In particular, efficiencies must not
arise from anticompetitive reductions in output, service or other competi-
tively significant categories, such as innovation. 143 Third, the revisions
refined the concept that efficiencies must be attributable to the merger -,
i.e., merger-specific - and could not be achieved in a less anticompetitive
way.144 Finally, efficiency analysis now expressly incorporates a sliding
scale approach. The revisions state that the agencies will require proof
of greater efficiencies as the likely anticompetitive effects of the merger
increase. 145
These are standards that defense lawyers, enforcement officials, and
judges can and do turn to in arguing efficiency questions, and they have
made a difference, both in the way efficiencies claims are presented to
the antitrust agencies and in the way they are litigated. For example, the
FTC has relied on such efficiencies in deciding not to challenge certain
transactions, such as hospital mergers. However, efficiencies should al-
most never justify a merger to monopoly or near monopoly, and that is
true both in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and in litigated cases.
The discussion of two recent cases illustrates judicial analysis of merger
efficiencies under the revised Merger Guidelines: F.T.C. v. Staples,
Inc.,146 and F.T.C. v. Cardinal Health, Inc.147
a. Staples/Office Depot.
In Staples,148 the court considered efficiencies for the first time
since the Merger Guidelines were amended in 1997. The court's discus-
sion of efficiencies began with the cases that expressed skepticism to-
wards cost savings claims and proceeded with a careful analysis based
141 See id. at 20,573-11.
142 See id at 20,573-13.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
147 12 F. Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998).
148 For a more detailed discussion of the facts of the case, see Part I.B.1.
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on the Merger Guidelines framework. In particular, the court examined
whether the cost savings claims of Staples and Office Depot were sub-
stantial, unique to the merger, and likely to be shared with the consuming
public.' 49
The merging parties asserted many efficiency claims, but the most
important was that the combined firm would have greater purchasing
power and could extract better prices from its various vendors. The court
rejected the efficiency argument on two grounds: first, the claims were
substantially exaggerated, 150 and second, even if buying power was an
"efficiency," the merger was not necessary to increase buying power be-
cause both parties to the merger were expanding rapidly.
The court's rejection of these claims based on the lack of merger
specific efficiencies, established an important principle for future merger
enforcement. Both parties to the merger were expanding rapidly by
opening new stores, as many as 100 or 150 new stores per year for each,
so that increased buying power from the merger, even assuming it could
be used to extract better prices from vendors, would have occurred as a
result of internal expansion absent the merger. 51 If there was an effi-
ciency in the merger, it involved the fact that the larger enterprise would
be created immediately rather than over a period of 3 or 4 years. Those
efficiencies would have been temporary and declining in significance.
The merger, on the other hand, and its anticompetitive effects, would
have been permanent.
In hindsight that assessment seems to be correct. Just three years
after the proposed merger both Staples and Office Depot have achieved
the size (about 1000 stores) that the single firm would have achieved
through the merger. 152 Thus, whatever efficiencies would have been ac-
complished through greater size are probably being achieved by both
firms today without an attendant loss of competition.
b. Cardinal Health, Inc.
This case involved the FTC's challenge of proposed mergers be-
tween Cardinal Health and Bergen, and between McKesson and Amer-
isource153- the four largest drug wholesalers in the United States.15 4 If
both mergers had been allowed to proceed, the leading national drug
149 See Staples, 970 F.Supp. at 1075-76.
150 See id. at 1089-91. For example, the cost savings estimate submitted in Court ex-
ceeded by almost 500% the figures presented to the Boards of Directors of the two firms when
they approved the transaction. See id. at 1089.
151 See id.
152 See Company Profiles, <http://biz.yahoo.comlp/S/sls.html> (Staples), <http://
biz.yahoo.com/p/o/odp.html> (Office Depot).
153 See FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998).
154 See id. at 37.
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wholesalers would have been reduced from four to two, and those two
companies would have a combined market share of up to 80% of the
pharmaceutical wholesale market. 155 Like Judge Hogan in the Staples
case, Judge Sporkin acknowledged that the previous decisions of the
Supreme Court probably would preclude giving any weight to claimed
efficiencies. However, the judge recognized the tendency of lower
courts to take efficiencies into account, and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's departure from the old Supreme Court cases in revising the
Merger Guidelines. 15 6 The court elected to follow the approach of the
1997 Guidelines revisions, and its analysis establishes that although the
efficiency claims of the merging firms will be carefully considered, such
claims also will be weighed in light of the competitive concerns raised by
increases in market power.'5 7
In Cardinal Health the defendants claimed several different sources
of efficiencies: (1) distributional efficiencies through the closing of over-
lapping centers, (2) superior purchasing practices, (3) increased buying
power, and (4) reduction in overhead and inventory costs. 158 The parties
argued that the efficiencies would be substantial, ranging in the three
years after the merger from $220 million to over $307 million, that at
least 50% would be passed along to consumers (in contrast to their his-
torical average of 80%), and that the efficiencies were a major if not
principal reason for the mergers. 159
The court's careful analysis found strong evidence that many of
these efficiencies could be produced in the absence of the merger. The
court noted that "the history of the industry.. . demonstrates the power
of competition to lower cost structures and garner efficiencies as
well,"'160 and expressed concern that the mergers would remove the pres-
sure to be more efficient and price competitive.
The court also looked closely at the argument that the mergers
would remove excess capacity from the market. Although conceding
those actions would produce cost savings, Judge Sporkin used the 1997
Horizontal Merger Guidelines framework to assess how the proposed ef-
ficiencies would affect competition in the market. 161 The court noted
that company documents equated excess capacity with pricing pressures
and stiff competition, and the documents expressed hope that consolida-
155 See id. at 66.
156 See id. at 62.
157 See iL at 63.
158 See id. at 62.
159 See id. at 62-63.
160 Id. at 63.
161 See id. at 62. See also 1997 MERGER GUriENs, supra note 141, at § 4 ("The
Agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and magnitude
such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market").
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tion at the top of the industry would bring "a more orderly market" and
"rational pricing."' 62 The court relied as well on customer testimony that
affirmed the competitive role of excess capacity.163 Judge Sporkin con-
cluded that the "mergers would likely curb downward pricing pressures
and adversely affect competition in the market."' 64
The court correctly posed the ultimate question when it stated,
"[t]he critical question raised by the efficiencies defense is whether the
projected savings from the mergers are enough to overcome the evidence
that tends to show that possibly greater benefits can be achieved by the
public through existing, continued competition."' 165 The court concluded
that, "defendants simply have not made their case on this point." 166 Con-
sistent with the revised 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, efficiency
claims were carefully analyzed, but the parties faced a substantial burden
in attempting to justify mergers that would result in such a large increase
in market power.
C. HIGH TECH AND ANTITRUST
One of the most visible parts of recent antitrust activity has been the
number, and importance, of cases in high technology industries. The an-
titrust agencies devote a significant part of their resources to enforcement
in high tech industries, and this enforcement effort has increased in re-
cent years. 167 One reason for the increase is the sheer size of this sector,
in terms of the number of firms, total employment, and economic value
created. But even more important than the size of the sector is its grow-
ing importance as a source of innovation and economic growth. 168 Com-
petition in high tech industries must be protected by a strong antitrust
effort aimed at preventing the accumulation of market power either
through merger or its abuse in non merger contexts, otherwise U.S. eco-
nomic performance will suffer.
There are several important characteristics of high tech industries
that make application of the antitrust laws especially challenging. The
first is that the current pace of innovation is unprecedented.169 The speed
with which technology evolves is increasing in many industries. Per-
162 See Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d at 64.
163 See id. at 65.
164 Id. at 64.
165 IL at 63.
166 Id. at 63.
167 1999 Ar'Y GN. ANN. Accr. REP. § 3.31 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar99/index.html>.
168 See 1998 PRES. ECON. REP. 209 ("Many of the fastest growing and fastest changing
U.S. industries are to be found in such high-technology fields as aerospace, computer hardware
and software, and telecommunications").
169 See FTC, Staff Report, supra note 140, at Ch. 6, 14-15.
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sonal computers, software and cellular telephones increase in speed and
sophistication as fast as prices fall. Innovation in other high technology
areas may seem sluggish in comparison to the computer and telecommu-
nication industries, but it actually proceeds quite rapidly. In the pharma-
ceutical industry, in particular, firms engaged in genetic research are
rapidly expanding the boundaries of knowledge across all areas of
medicine. In the financial sector, new technology is rearranging entire
industries. This technological fever means that innovation may erode
market power, at least where it cannot be controlled or managed by the
market leader.
Because of this rapid technological change, competition has come to
be defined by innovation in many high tech industries, unlike more tradi-
tional industries where competition is most often driven by price. In
high tech industries, nonprice attributes of products, such as performance
characteristics and compatibility with other products, 170 can be more im-
portant to customers. 171 The Merger Guidelines explicitly recognize the
importance of nonprice competition by noting that competition may be
harmed in the area of "product quality, service, or innovation."'172 This
increased emphasis on nonprice competition in high tech industries can
be procompetitive. Because the range of nonprice attributes is infinite,
competitors may find nonprice collusion more difficult than collusion
over price. 173
Much of the agencies' high tech enforcement effort has focused on
mergers. 174 When cutting-edge technology is owned or licensed to only
a few firms, consolidation among those firms could eliminate the only
substantial actual or potential competitors. The agencies have been par-
ticularly active in the computer and pharmaceutical industries, bringing a
number of cases that have preserved competition without hampering in-
novation opportunities. A few of those cases are described below.
170 See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. Rav. 940 (1986).
171 See Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Innovation Issues Under the 1992 Merger
Guidelines, 61 ANrrrusT L.J. 505, 506-07 (1993) ("Our own experience at the FrC indicates
that there are increasing numbers of mergers that raise issues relating to competition over
matters such as new product development, new methods of distribution, or other forms of
innovation").
172 1992 HomrzoNrAL MERGER GurD.Enms, supra note 51, at § 0.1 n. 6.
173 Although nonprice collusion may be difficult, experience shows that it does occur and
can have serious anticompetitive consequences. See United States v. Automobile Mfrs.
Ass'n., 1969 Trade Case. (CCH) 72,907 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (consent decree).
174 See David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven, Antitrust Remedies in High Technology
Industries, ANmusT RE'., Jan. 1999, at 22.
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1. Digital-Intel.
In the computer industry, innovation in some markets may be lim-
ited to only a few firms. 175 Digital and Intel are aggressive rivals both
for current and next generation microprocessors. 176 In addition, Digital's
Alpha microprocessor is a significant competitor both to Intel's Pentium
microprocessor and to Intel's next generation IA-64 microprocessor. 177
In May 1997, both firms sued each other for patent infringement by their
respective products. 178 In October 1997, the suits were settled by agree-
ment contemplating broad patent cross-licenses, the sale of Digital's
microprocessor production facilities to Intel, and that Intel would pro-
duce Digital's Alpha microprocessors although Digital retained the intel-
lectual property rights to Alpha. 179
The FTC alleged that the agreement would reduce competition in
three separate markets: 1) the manufacture and sale of high-performance,
general purpose microprocessors capable of running Windows NT in na-
tive mode; 2) the manufacture and sale of all general purpose
microprocessors; and 3) the design and development of future genera-
tions of high-performance, general purpose microprocessors.1 80 In each
of those markets, Digital's Alpha chips happened to be the highest per-
forming and most technologically advanced threat facing Intel's
microprocessors.' 8 ' The Commission was concerned that Alpha would
not remain competitively viable under the original terms of the agree-
ment. Intel could interfere with Digital's supply of Alpha chips and Dig-
ital might not have the incentive to continue to actively develop and
promote Alpha.182
To resolve these concerns, the FTC issued a consent order under
which Digital would license the Alpha architecture to Samsung and
AMD or other suitable partners so that they would be able to produce
and develop Alpha chips. 183 Digital also agreed to begin the process of
certifying IBM as a foundry for Alpha chips to establish a manufacturing
alternative to Intel.'84 This relief preserves the Alpha chip as a viable
product and a competitor to Intel's microprocessors.
175 See In re Digital Equipment Corp., No. 3818, 1998 FTC LEXIS 75, at *8 (July 14,
1998).
176 See id. at *7.
177 See id. at *7-*8.
178 See id. at *3.
179 See id.
180 See id at *6-*7.
181 See id at *8.
182 See id at *12-*13.
183 See id. at *29.
184 See id. at *36.
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2. Dell Computer
One of the most contentious areas of antitrust enforcement involves
standard setting. Proprietary standards, in particular, may pose a number
of antitrust risks. The general danger of allowing a private party to own
intellectual property rights in an open standard (or to have it set a de
facto standard based on its intellectual property) is that the private party
at some time may choose to close the standard either by licensing it on a
discriminatory basis or by setting an unreasonable price for continued
access. If a proprietary standard has been widely adopted in a network
market, this form of "intellectual property ambush" can impose a signifi-
cant cost on the users of the standard.
The FTC faced this situation in its enforcement action against Dell
Computer. 185 In 1992, the Video Electronics Standards Association
(VESA) adopted a computer hardware standard called the VL-Bus stan-
dard, which governs the transmission of information between a com-
puter's central processing unit ("CPU") and its peripheral devices. 186
Each of the members voting to adopt the standard, including Dell Com-
puter Corporation, was required by VESA rules to affirm that they did
not own any patent rights that covered the VL-Bus standard.187 Dell's
representative did in fact make such a statement. Nonetheless, eight
months later, after the VL-Bus standard had been widely adopted, Dell
asserted a patent against other VESA members for using the VL-Bus
standard.188 Dell encouraged the group to adopt a standard that involved
technology that Dell allegedly knew was proprietary, and in doing so
obtained the help of its competitors in establishing a standard, which it
would ultimately be able to control.
Had Dell announced up front that the standards they were backing
were proprietary, it is unlikely that the affected participants would have
chosen those standards. At the very least, those standards would have
faced stiffer competition than they did. Instead, Dell obtained a domi-
nant position it could not have attained in open standards competition.
D. DIsTRiBUnONAL RESTRAINTS
Early during the Clinton Administration, Anne Bingaman, then As-
sistant Attorney General for Antitrust, signaled a new approach to verti-
cal restraints by announcing the rescission of the Department's Vertical
185 See In re Dell Computer Corp., C-3586, 60 Fed. Reg. 57,870 (Nov. 22, 1995) (con-
sent agreement).
186 See id at 57,872.
187 See id.
188 See id
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Restraints Guidelines promulgated in 1985.189 The Assistant Attorney
General described them as having been "controversial from the outset,"
and having been, "based on a premise that vertical restraints that only
affect intrabrand competition generally represent little anticompetitive
threat and involve some form of economic integration between different
levels of production or distribution that tend to create efficiencies."' 90
While conceding that the Guidelines, provided some useful guidance, she
observed that, "they unduly evaluated theory over factual analysis, and in
certain respects were at variance with existing case law," particularly, "to
the extent that they treated all agreements between distributors of a sin-
gle manufacturer as vertical rather than horizontal agreements, and
treated vertical price fixing agreements under a rule of reason analysis if
they were ancillary to non-price agreements." 191 The Assistant Attorney
General declared that the Antitrust Division would "treat vertical price
fixing as per se illegal, and non-price fixing restraints as subject to a
meaningful rule of reason analysis,"' 92 adding however, that she was not
"declaring war" on all vertical restraints, but rather was "cognizant of the
potential procompetitive effects of some vertical non-price restraints in a
variety of circumstances."' 93 Her purpose was to "look at vertical re-
straints in a more balanced manner than was reflected in the rescinded
Vertical Guidelines.' 94
Even before the rescission of the Vertical Restraint Guidelines, the
agencies renewed vertical enforcement, primarily involving resale price
maintenance ("RPM"). Beginning during the Bush Administration and
vigorously continuing in the Clinton Administration, the FTC has
brought a series of RPM cases. Some of these, indeed most, have turned
on the identification of a vertical agreement in ambiguous circumstances,
while others have turned on determining whether what was agreed upon
amounted to price-fixing.
In the Bush Administration, the FTC brought two RPM cases. In re
Kreepy Krauly, USA, Inc.,195 was one of the rare cases where there was
direct evidence of agreement in the form of a written contract fixing re-
189 See Anne K. Bingaman, Change and Continuity in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks
before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Fordham Law School (Oct. 21, 1993) (transcript
available at <http:lwww.usdoj.gov/atr/publlc/speeches/93-10-21.txt>) (visited Mar. 24, 2000)
(referring to the DEPARTmENT oF JusacE, 1985 VERTCAL RFsr.sTR GumiEu.ins, 50 Fed.
Reg. 6,263 (Feb. 14, 1985) [hereinafter VERTCAL RESTRArNT GUIDEUNES]).
190 Anne K. Bingaman, Change and Continuity in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks before
the Fordhan Corporate Law Institute, Fordham Law School (Oct. 21, 1993) (transcript avail-
able at < http:lwww.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/93-10-21.txt>) (visited Mar. 24, 2000).
191. Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 114 FTC 777 (1991).
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sale prices. In that case, the distribution agreements provided that deal-
ers would use their best efforts to adhere to Kreepy Krauly's suggested
retail prices.196 In In re Nintendo, 97 another 1991 case, the Commission
inferred agreement from a pattern of coercion and threats of termina-
tion.198 The Commission alleged that Nintendo had not simply termi-
nated dealers that did not comply with the suggested prices, as was its
right under United States v. Colgate,199 but instead had used threats to
cut off or reduce supplies to noncomplying dealers as a way of coercing
assent.200 The consent order prohibited the firm from engaging in vari-
ous conduct that could implement resale price maintenance agreements,
including taking punitive actions against discounting dealers, reducing
their supplies, or granting them unfavorable credit terms.20' As a matter
of "fencing-in relief," the Commission order prohibited Nintendo from
terminating dealers on the basis of the resale price they charge.202
The Clinton Administration's antitrust enforcers built on this foun-
dation of resale price management analysis to evaluate somewhat more
novel approaches to restrict resale prices. One area of inquiry involves
"structured termination" policies, under which, manufacturers suggest re-
sale prices and give warnings or suspend dealers for a given period of
time if they do not conform. A second or third violation generally re-
quires termination.20 3 One commentator suggests that these policies con-
stitute an agreement because "the dealer's compliance after the first (or
second) suspension constitutes communicated acquiescence. ' '2°4
While the FTC has neither adopted nor rejected this view, its cases
against Reebok205 and New Balance,20 6 illustrafed how "structured ter-
mination policies" may lead to conversations that go over the line.
Reebok and New Balance had structured termination policies that gave a
retailer one warning if it failed to adhere to suggested retail prices. A
second violation required termination.207 The problem with these poli-
cies, as most manufacturers discover, is that the people who are responsi-
ble for implementing the policies are sales representatives, not antitrust
196 See id.
197 114 FTC 702 (1991).
198 See id.
199 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (recognizing a firm's freedom to select those customers with
whom it wishes to do business, when the firm acts independently and does not have absence of
market power).
200 See In re Nintendo, 114 FTC 702 (1991).
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See, e.g., In re Reebok Int'l Ltd., 130 FTC. 20 (1995); In re New Balance Athletic
Shoes, Inc., 122 FTC 137 (1996).
204 Richard Steuer, The Distribution Superhighway, ArN usr, at 4,6 (1994).
205 In re Reebok Int'l Ltd., 130 FrC, at 23.
206 In re New Balance Athletic Shoes, Inc., 122 FTC, at 140.
207 See Reebok, 130 FTC at 23; New Balance, 122 FTC, at 140.
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lawyers. Warnings tend to lead to a series of discussions about the pro-
priety of the retail price or about how the distributor or retailer can come
into compliance with the policy. Often these conversations lead to a
meeting of the minds about how the parties will behave in the future.
For example, dealers might get reinstated when they promise to raise
their prices to suggested levels. Those actions may well establish an
agreement on resale prices, as they did in these two cases.
The FTC did not address directly the legality of the structured ter-
mination policies; rather it challenged the agreements that resulted from
the dialogue between the manufacturers and their retailers as an out-
growth of the structured termination policies.208 The consent orders did
provide as a matter of fencing-in relief, however, that for ten years the
manufacturers could not use such a "structured termination" policy.20 9
Those structured termination provisions had played a significant role in
causing the firms to go over the line, and it was important to remove that
source of temptation.
In the rare instance, such as the Commission's enforcement action
against American Cyanamid, 210 the question was not whether there is an
agreement, but whether the identified agreement fixed the resale price or
price levels.
1. American Cyanamid
American Cyanamid had established a rebate program in a $1 bil-
lion agricultural chemical market, reflected in written agreements with its
dealers, that paid a substantial rebate for each resale of crop protection
chemicals at or above floor prices.21' American Cyanamid had set
wholesale prices equal to the stated minimum prices, so the dealers lost
money on every sale below the specified price. In 1997, the Commission
challenged this rebate scheme as an attempt by a manufacturer to estab-
lish resale prices through finely tuned incentives rather than direct agree-
ment.212 The question was not whether there was an agreement, but
whether the agreement fixed the resale price or price levels.
In the Commission's view, as the complaint alleged, the program
amounted to a quid pro quo between American Cyanamid and its dealers,
under which American Cyanamid explicitly promised to pay dealers in
exchange for adhering to the suggested price, essentially establishing an
208 See Reebok, 130 FTC at 20; New Balance, 122 FTC at 137.
209 See Reebok, 130 FTC at 23; New Balance, 122 FTC at 140.
210 123 F.T.C. 1257, 1260 (1997).
211 See id. at 1258.
212 See id. at 1260. In part, the consent order prohibits American Cyanamid from condi-
tioning the payment of rebates or other incentives on the resale prices its dealers charge for
American Cyanamid products. A multi-state task force obtained a settlement valued at $7.3
million.
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agreement on price or price level. 213 This issue shows the contrast be-
tween the treatment of traditional cooperative advertising programs,2 14
which are analyzed under the rule of reason, 215 and schemes in which
dealers are explicitly paid to adhere to a particular price or price level,
which are not legal. Notably, American Cyanamid does not take issue
with other cases addressing dealer assistance programs, including price
restricted cooperative advertising and discount pass-through programs.
2. Major Music Distributors
One important area of resale price maintenance enforcement in-
volves price-restricted cooperative advertising programs. These pro-
grams condition the manufacturer's grant of cooperative advertising
allowances to dealers on dealers' agreements not to advertise a price be-
low the manufacturer's suggested price or, in some cases, to advertise
affirmatively the manufacturer's suggested price. These are often called
minimum advertised price or MAP programs. MAP programs play a vi-
tal role in competition in many industries where advertising is important,
especially consumer electronics. The legal treatment of MAP programs
has changed during the past two decades. During the Carter Administra-
tion the agencies treated these as per se illegal. In the Reagan Adminis-
tration, that policy was abandoned and they now are analyzed under the
rule of reason.216 A recent enforcement action demonstrates how the
Clinton Administration has taken a reasonable but careful enforcement
position toward these programs.
In May of 2000, the Commission brought an enforcement action
against each of the five major recorded music distributors for their use of
MAP programs in the sale of compact discs. 217 The Commission alleged
that these programs both facilitated horizontal collusion among the dis-
tributors, in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act218
213 Id. at 1267-68.
214 In traditional cooperative advertising programs, manufacturers help dealers pay for
advertising or promotion, but add the condition that in the advertisements supported by the
manufacturer, the dealer cannot include any price advertising unless the prices are at or above
suggested levels. These programs are unlikely to raise antitrust concerns as long as dealers are
free to price at whatever level they choose when they buy their own advertisements.
215 See supra notes 190-195 and accompanying text.
216 Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Policy Regarding Price Restrictions in Co-
operative Advertising Programs-Rescission, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 139,057 (May 21,
1987).
217 See In re Time Warner Inc.; In re Sony Music Entertainment Inc.; In re Capitol
Records, Inc., d.b.a. "EMUS Music Distribution"; In re Universal Music & Video Distribution
Corp. and UG. Recordings, Inc.; and In re BIG Music, d.b.a. "BIG Entertainment", No. 971-
0070, (visited May 30, 2000) <http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/2000/O05index.htm> (accepted for public
comment, May 10, 2000).
218 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1996). This section, in pertinent part, makes unlawful "[u]nfair meth-
ods of competition in or affecting commerce." Courts interpret §5 to include conduct prohib-
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and, when viewed individually, constituted unreasonable vertical re-
straint of trade under the rule of reason. Each respondent settled the case
agreeing to abandon the practices at issue.219
The complaints accompanying the proposed orders allege that the
five companies collectively dominate this market, and that they each
adopted significantly stricter MAP programs between late 1995 and 1996
in reaction to concern about widespread retail discounting in compact
discs that was pressuring both retail and distribution margins.220 Under
these new MAP provisions, retailers seeking any cooperative advertising
funds were required to honor the distributors' minimum advertised prices
in all media advertisements, even in advertisements funded solely by the
retailers. These retailers were also required to adhere to the distributors'
minimum advertised prices on all in-store signs and displays, regardless
of whether the distributor contributed to their cost. These restrictions
went beyond those of traditional MAP programs that restricted solely the
prices in the advertisements paid for by the manufacturers. Failure to
adhere to the respondents' MAP provisions for any particular music title
would subject the retailer to a suspension of all cooperative advertising
funding from this distributor for an extended period, typically 60 to 90
days. The complaints assert that the severity of these penalties ensured
that even the most aggressive retail competitors would stop advertising
prices below MAP. The complaints further allege that by defining adver-
tising broadly enough to include all in-store displays and signs, the MAP
policies effectively precluded many retailers from communicating prices
below MAP to their customers, and in large part deterred such pricing by
depriving it of beneficial effect on sales. The impact on consumers of
these restrictions was substantial: consumers ultimately paid more than
$400 million in higher prices.221
The Commission's recent RPM enforcement actions might have
suggested that it would treat these programs as per se illegal, but instead,
ited by the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1999), Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-
13c, 21a (1999), and the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1999). See, e.g., FTC v. Motion
Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); FrC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948);
American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
Similarly, § 5 also extends to certain conduct "even though the practice does not infringe
either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws." FrC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S.
233, 239 (1972).
219 See FTC, Press Release, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining Com-
petition in CD Music Market, (visited May 30, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/opa/2000105/
cdpres.htm>.
220 See FTC Complaints, (visited May 30, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/
index.htm>.
221 See FTC, Press Release, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining Com-
petition in CD Music Market, (visited May 30, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/
cdpres.htm>.
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it analyzed the programs under the rule of reason.222 The Commission's
Statement observes that, in the past, the Commission "has employed the
rule of reason to examine cooperative advertising programs that restrict
reimbursement for the advertising of discounts, because such programs
may be procompetitive or competitively neutral." 223 However, the MAP
policies it had dealt with in the past did not prohibit retailers from selling
at discount prices or advertising discounts or sale prices with their own
funds, and the policies in the cases went well beyond these restraints.
The Commission nonetheless concluded that rule of reason treat-
ment is still appropriate, because it could not find here the "agreement on
price or price levels" required by Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp.224 as a basis for per se illegality of vertical agree-
ments. The advertising payments here were, strictly speaking, tied to
advertising of one kind or another, not to pricing itself, and there was
even evidence that some retailers on rare occasions had sold product at
discount without advertising price, other than as a "guaranteed low
price. '225 "In our view," the Commission wrote, "Sharp requires some-
thing more than a showing that an agreement has some influence on
price." 226
The Commission concluded, nonetheless, that the distributors' MAP
policies were unlawful under the rule of reason:
The five distributors together account for over 85 per-
cent of the market, and each has market power in that no
music retailer can realistically choose not to carry the
music of any of the five major distributors. The MAP
policies were adopted by each of the distributors for the
purpose of stabilizing retail prices. The MAP policies
achieved their purpose and effectively stabilized retail
prices with consequential effects on wholesale prices,
ending the price competition that previously existed in
the retail marketplace and the resulting pressure on the
distributors' margins. Compliance with the MAP poli-
cies - which was secured through significant financial
incentives - effectively eliminated the retailers' ability to
communicate discounts to consumers. Even absent an
222 See Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony,
Mozelle W. Thompson, Orson Swindle, and Thomas B. Leary (May 10, 2000) (transcript
available at <http:llwww.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/cdstatement.htm>) (visited May 30, 2000) (here-
inafter "Commission Statement')
223 See id., citing Statement of Poliby Regarding Price Restrictions in Cooperative Adver-
tising Programs - Rescission, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 39,057.
224 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988).
225 See Commission Statement, supra note 223.
226 Id.
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actual agreement to refrain from discounting, this inabil-
ity to effectively communicate discounts to consumers
meant that retailers had little incentive to actually sell
product at a discount.227
The Commission added a strong cautionary note, observing that
"[i]n the future" it would "view with great skepticism" MAP programs
"that effectively eliminate the ability of dealers to sell product at a
discount."228
3. Toys 'R' Us.
In October 1998, the Commission held that Toys 'R' Us had vio-
lated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act229 by inducing major toy
manufacturers to agree - both with Toys 'R' Us and among themselves -
to deal with warehouse clubs, like Costco and Sam's Club, on less
favorable terms.230 By the early 1990s, Toys 'R' Us faced a new com-
petitive threat: the warehouse clubs, with their innovative, low cost, no
frills approach, had begun selling toys at prices that were lower than
Toys 'R' Us prices, which affected the Toys 'R' Us low-price image and
threatened its market position. 231 In .response, Toys 'R' Us orchestrated
agreements with and among toy manufacturers to withhold from the
clubs toys they were selling to Toys 'R' Us. 232 The agreements permit-
ted the manufacturers to package two or more toys into more expensive,
less desirable "club specials," or to sell other differentiated products.
The effect was to make it more difficult for consumers to make
price comparisons between the clubs and Toys 'R' Us, thus eliminating
the pricing pressure that the clubs were putting on Toys 'R' Us. 233 These
restrictions were not in the manufacturer's individual self-interest. Ac-
cording to the FTC, Toys 'R' Us had to threaten that it would not carry
toy items that the suppliers sold to the clubs, and provide assurances that
other manufacturers were going along with the boycott.234 The FTC
noted that these agreements could be per se illegal under Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,235 which was similar on its facts, but the
227 d.(internal citations ommitted).
228 Id.
229 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1996). See also supra note 219.
230 See In re Toys 'R' Us, Inc. No. 9278, 1998 FTC LEXIS 119, at *1 (Oct. 13, 1998).
The Decision and Order have been appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. See Toys 'R' Us., Inc. v. FTC, Dkt. No. 98-4108 (7' Cir. Filed Dec. 7, 1998).
Oral argument was heard on May 18, 1999.
231 See In re Toys 'R' Us, 1998 FTC LEXIS 119, at *19.
232 See id.
233 See id. at *22-*23.
234 See id. at *36.
235 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
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Commission chose to apply the more critical analysis under the Supreme
Court's more recent decision in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.3 6 and accordingly determined that the
per se rule was appropriate for this case.237
The FTC also held that Toys 'R' Us' conduct in orchestrating the
boycott was unlawful even under a rule of reason review.238 That hold-
ing was based on the FTC's findings that Toys 'R' Us' conduct in or-
ganizing a group boycott of the warehouse clubs produced demonstrable
anticompetitive effects, such as preventing a decrease in the prices that
consumers pay for toys, and that the sole business justification proffered,
the prevention of free riding, was mere pretext.239 The Commission also
held that, "each agreement in the series of vertical agreements, standing
alone, even without the evidence of horizontal agreement among many
of the toy manufacturers violates § 1 of the Sherman Act upon a full rule
of reason review."240
Several factors distinguish this case from the typically benign non-
price vertical restraint. As an initial matter, the FTC found that the Toys
'R' Us conduct was in no way unilateral conduct protected by United
States v. Colgate.24 1 The record was full of references to requests for
commitments between Toys 'R' Us and the manufacturers, and compli-
ance with these requests24 2 Toys 'R' Us has not challenged this finding
on appeal. As it is well-recognized, vertical non-price agreements can
increase competition. 24 3 An important distinguishing factor in the Toys
'R' Us case was that the key manufacturers committed to adopt the re-
straints only when they received assurances that their competitors were
adopting substantially similar restrictions.24 4 No individual toy manufac-
turer wanted to give up this promising new retail outlet unless its com-
petitors would do the same. This significantly reduced any likelihood
that competition would be increased by the restraints. Indeed, the Com-
mission found that Toys 'R' Us' actions both deprived consumers of the
low prices that Toys 'R' Us' competitors could provide and insulated
Toys 'R' Us from competitive pressures of the club stores.24 5
Two other factors distinguish this case from the typical vertical re-
straint case. First, Toys 'R' Us had significant power to influence the
236 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985).
237 See In re Toys 'R' Us, 1998 FTC LEXIS 119, at *105.
238 See id. at *123.
239 See id. at *144-*45.
240 Id. at 157.
241 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
242 See In re Toys 'R' Us, 1998 FTC LEXIS 119, at *71.
243 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
244 See In re Toys 'R Us, 1998 FTC LEXIS 119, at *71.
245 See id. at *157.
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manufacturers. The manufacturers testified that it would be very difficult
to replace sales to Toys 'R' Us,246 because it accounted for well over
30% of sales in most major metropolitan areas.247 Toys "R" Us was
substantially larger than any other retailer. Second, Toys 'R' Us vigor-
ously asserted a free rider defense and the FTC found it wanting.248
Toys 'R' Us argued its actions were justified to combat free riding by the
clubs on services provided by Toys 'R' Us. But the FTC found that Toys
'R' Us received cooperative advertising dollars that covered over 99% of
the costs of advertising.249 Toys 'R' Us also argued that the clubs free
ride on the fact that Toys 'R' Us carries product much earlier in the year.
The FTC found, however, that Toys 'R' Us was specifically compen-
sated for early purchases by not having to pay for the product till the end
of the year.250 Finally, Toys 'R' Us argued that the manufacturers testi-
fied at trial that they adopted the restraints in response to free riding, yet
the FTC found that manufacturers feared being placed at a competitive
disadvantage unless their competitors adopted the same restraints.251
These findings undercut any notion that the manufacturers restrained
sales to the clubs for unilateral reasons such as stopping free riding.
4. State Oil Co. v. Khan.
The role of the antitrust agencies is not simply to bring enforcement
actions - they should also clarify the law to promote more efficient distri-
bution arrangements. In 1997, the Antitrust Division of DOJ and the
FTC joined as amici curiae in filing a brief in State Oil Co. v. Khan,252
asking the Supreme Court to reverse its 1968 opinion in Albrecht v. Her-
ald Co,253 that held that maximum resale price maintenance was per se
illegal. The agencies' brief, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum,254 observed that the manufac-
turer's decision to fix a maximum resale price may actually protect con-
sumers against exploitation by the dealer acting as a local monopolist.255
Thus, it was the agencies' view that in the vertical maximum price fixing
context, the per se illegality rule could be anti-consumer and ought to be
changed. Moreover, the agencies asserted that the per se rule had little
246 See id. at *8.
247 See id.
248 See id. at *130-'147.
249 See id. at *137.
250 See id. at *138.
251 See id. at *145-*146.
252 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Reversal, State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
253 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
254 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
255 See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amidi Curiae
Supporting Reversal, State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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effect on government enforcement, since the antitrust agencies had not
committed any enforcement resources to challenge a vertical maximum
resale price maintenance arrangement in recent memory.256 The
Supreme Court accepted these arguments and reversed the prior decision
in Albrecht.257 One interesting aspect of this case was that the state at-
torneys general took the opposite position, and filed an amicus brief urg-
ing that Albrecht be retained.258
5. Distribution on the Internet
Clearly the fastest growing retail market is commerce on the In-
ternet. Over the past few years the number of retail sites has grown dra-
matically and many traditional retailers have entered with their own
Internet sites. The amount of commerce on the Internet has grown
exponentially. 25 9
The role of antitrust in emerging markets such as electronic com-
merce ("e-commerce") is to make sure that competitors have the oppor-
tunity to compete, to offer new products and services, and to reach the
consumer in an efficient manner. Unfortunately when new markets arise,
participants in the traditional market may act together to inhibit this de-
velopment. Boycotts arose in the past in response to new forms of distri-
bution. Discount car dealers, mail order firms, and 800-number retailers,
have all encountered illegal boycotts brought by associations of more
"traditional" retailers. The FTC has brought several cases in the past
where firms attempt to prevent new forms of retailing from arising.
Now, antitrust enforcers have again stepped in to prevent the boycott and
permit new forms of retailing to grow and flourish in the context of e-
commerce.
In 1998, the FTC brought a case to protect the opportunity to sell
cars over the Internet.260 A Chrysler dealership in Kellogg, Idaho, used
the Internet to attract customers from around the northwest by creating a
web site where consumers could shop for cars from the comfort of their
home.26' The potential importance of Internet marketing in rural Idaho
is substantial. Shopping for cars involves significant search costs and
256 See id.
257 State Oil Co., 522 U.S. 3 (1997)
258 See Brief of Thirty-Three States and the Territory of Guam in Support of Respon-
dents, State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
259 See The Internet Economy Indicators, (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http:II
www.intemetindicators.com>; David A. Balto, Emerging Antitrust Issues in Electronic Com-
merce, Remarks before the 1999 Antitrust Institute, Columbus, Ohio (Nov. 12, 1999) (tran-
script available at <http:lwww.ftc.gov/speecheslother/ecommerce.htm>) (visited Apr. 27,
2000).
260 See In re Fair Allocation System, Inc., No. 971-0065, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,182 (Aug. 12,
1998) (proposed consent order).
261 See id.
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long drives to dealerships dispersed in different parts of the state, and a
typical consumer might have few choices. By advertising on the In-
ternet, this Kellogg dealer offered consumers in remote parts of the state
the opportunity to shop in a far less costly and less time consuming
fashion.
Not all the upper northwest car dealers responded favorably to this
innovation. A group of 25 dealerships formed an association called Fair
Allocation System ("FAS").262 FAS collectively attempted to force
Chrysler to change its vehicle allocation system to disadvantage the In-
ternet advertiser. 263 They threatened to refuse to sell Chrysler vehicles
and to limit the warranty service they would provide to customers unless
Chrysler changed its allocation system to disadvantage dealers that sold
large quantities of vehicles outside their local geographic area.264 The
FTC obtained a consent decree barring FAS from coordinating or partici-
pating in future boycotts.265
This does not mean, of course, that a manufacturer is compelled to
deal with any Internet retailer. A manufacturer acting unilaterally has the
right to refuse to deal with whomever it chooses. Indeed, a manufacturer
may choose not to deal with retailers on the Internet because those retail-
ers may free ride on the efforts of full service retailers. In the FAS case,
that justification was absent since Chrysler applauded this dealership and
its use of the Internet.266
E. DoMINANT FiRm CoNDuCT
From 1980 to 1992, the antitrust agencies brought less than a hand-
ful of monopolization cases. In the 1970s, cases such as In re 1BM 267
and In re Exxon268 consumed vast prosecutorial resources in pretrial liti-
gation in cases that were ultimately abandoned without any resolution of
the substantive issues. 269 Some commentators wondered whether the an-
titrust agencies could effectively enforce the law against abuse of mo-
262 See id.
263 See id.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 475 F.Supp.1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd 618 F.2d 923 (2nd Cir. 1980), mandamus
granted, 687 F.2d 591 (2' Cir. 1982).
268 98 FTC 453 (Sept. 16, 1981) (dismissal order).
269 In 1982, the Justice Department dropped its long-running case against IBM, a case
that was filed on the last business day of the Johnson Administration in 1969. See United
States v. International Business Machines Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1969)
(complaint). In 1981, the Commission dismissed its case against Exxon and seven other major
oil companies who had been charged with collectively maintaining and reinforcing a noncom-
petitive market structure in the refining of crude oil into petroleum products. See Exxon Corp.,
98 FTC 453 (Sept. 16, 1981) (dismissal order).
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nopoly power.270 Additionally, the agencies brought relatively few
monopolization cases because the law in this area is difficult. Both the
agencies and the courts recognize that the antitrust laws should not be
used to dilute the incentive of companies to compete fiercely for market
share even as they get close to monopoly levels. On the other hand, it is
clear that monopoly can harm consumers and competition by leading to
higher prices, reduced output, and reduced innovation. An effective mo-
nopoly policy is essential to maintain consumer choice, competitive
prices, and a high level of innovation. Balancing these two priorities is
not always easy.271
Recent agency activity demonstrates that § 2 of the Sherman Act 272
can be enforced in a timely and effective manner by marshaling re-
sources on narrowly focused cases where consumer harm is evident and
relief can be accomplished without dampening the competitive aggres-
siveness of firms with large market shares. Two of the highest profile
antitrust cases in years, United States v. Microsoft73 and In re Intel,274
both deal with dominant firm behavior in fast-growing industries. Main-
taining competition in these industries is vital to the spread of technology
and innovation across the entire economy.
1. Intel
In 1998, the FTC filed a complaint against Intel, alleging that it
violated § 5 of the FTC Act275 by abusing monopoly power in the world-
wide general purpose microprocessor market.276 Intel has monopoly
270 See William Kovacic, Failed Expectations?: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future
of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IowA L. REv. 1105, 1106-09 (1989).
271 Of course, it is a generalization to imply that large, complex monopolization cases
could never be successful. The Justice Department's monopolization case against AT&T, filed
in 1976, led to the break-up of the world's largest monopoly firm and a subsequent period of
rapid growth and innovation in the telecommunications industry. See United States v. AT&T,
552 F.Supp. 131 (D. D.C.1982) (consent decree), affd sub nom., Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
272 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1999).
273 87 F.Supp.2d 30 (2000).
274 No. 9288, 1999 FTC LEXIS 38, at *1 (Mar.17, 1999) (consent); 1999 FTC LEXIS
145, at *1 (Aug. 3, 1999) (decision and order).
275 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1996). The FTC applies Sherman Act standards under § 5 of the FTC
Act.
276 See In re Intel Corp., No. 9288, 1999 FTC LEXIS 38, at *3 (Mar. 17, 1999). The
microprocessor market has several unique features. Computer design and manufacture re-
quires complex coordination between a number of different disciplines, almost always spread
among many different firms. Microprocessors, memory components, core logic chips, graph-
ics controllers, various input and output devices, and software must all work effectively with
each other in order for the final product to work. To achieve effective integration, computer
manufacturers require product specifications and other technical information about each com-
ponent, and they require such information in advance of designing the computer in order to test
and debug to insure the reliability and performance of each component and the system as a
whole. This information is provided by all component makers, including Intel, subject to
108 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PuBLIc POLICY
power because its market share was approximately 80 percent of dollar
sales.277 The microprocessor market has high entry barriers, including
large sunk costs of design and manufacture, substantial economies of
scale, customers' investments in existing software, the need to attract
support from software developers, and reputational barriers. 278 The FTC
alleged that Intel sought to maintain its dominance by, among other
things, denying advance technical information and product samples of
microprocessors to Intel customers ("original equipment manufacturers"
or "OEMs") and threatening to withhold product from those OEMs in
order to coerce those customers into licensing their patented innovations
to Intel.279
The FTC's complaint charged that Intel suspended its traditional in-
formation sharing with three customers - DEC, Intergraph, and Compaq -
in order to force those customers to end disputes with Intel concerning
the intellectual property rights and to grant Intel licenses to patented
technology (not just microprocessor technology) developed and owned
by those customers. 280 Digital and Compaq capitulated quickly and en-
tered into cross-license arrangements with Intel. Intergraph was able to
resist only because it succeeded in obtaining an injunction against Intel's
conduct in a federal court.281
Intel's conduct was exclusionary because it reinforced its domi-
nance of the general purpose microprocessor market in at least three
ways. First, Intel's alleged conduct would give it access to technology
being developed by others in the industry and disadvantage other
microprocessor manufacturers that are trying to challenge Intel's domi-
nance. Second, forcing other firms to license away rights to their propri-
etary technology dulls the incentive to innovate, thus harming
competition in several ancillary markets. Third, Intel's forced acquisi-
tion of nonprocessor technology from computer OEMs reduces the abil-
formal nondisclosure agreements. This information sharing has substantial commercial value
to both sides of the agreement, the component makers and the computer original equipment
manufacturers ("OEMs").
The computer industry is characterized by short, dynamic product cycles, which are gen-
erally measured in months. Time to market is crucial. Denial of advance product information
is virtually tantamount to a denial of actual parts, because an OEM customer lacking such
information cannot design new computer systems on a competitive schedule with other OEMs.
An OEM who suffers denial of such information over a period of months will lose much of the
profits it might otherwise have earned even from a successful new computer model. Contin-
ued denial of advance technical information to an OEM by a dominant supplier can make a
customer's very existence as an OEM untenable.
277 See id.
278 See id. at *4-*6.
279 See id. at *6.
280 See id. *8-*19.
281 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d 1255 (N.D.Ala. 1998), vacated 195
F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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ity of those OEMs to support a non-Intel microprocessor platform by
taking away an OEM's proprietary technology that could have been used
to market its machines. Thus, for example, Compaq would be much less
able to support an AMD or Digital microprocessor system by advertising
its own technology because Intel has forced Compaq to license that other
technology to Intel. Intel could in turn license Compaq's technology
back to other OEMs that support Intel microprocessor platform.
Such conduct harms consumers, not only because competition
brings lower prices, but also because competition is a powerful spur to
the development of new, better, and more diverse products and technolo-
gies. Unjustified conduct by a monopolist that removes the incentive to
such competition by depriving innovators of their reward or otherwise
tilting the playing field against new entrants or fringe competitors has a
direct and substantial impact upon future consumers. In the absence of a
legitimate business justification that outweighs these concerns, such con-
duct constitutes a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act,282 and therefore,
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.283
Intel case was settled by a consent order.284 The consent order pro-
hibits Intel from withholding or threatening to withhold certain advance
technical information or microprocessors, from a customer for reasons
relating to an intellectual property dispute with that customer.285 This
requirement is limited to the types of information that Intel routinely
gives to customers to enable them to use Intel microprocessors, and it
does not impose a "compulsory licensing" requirement in the first in-
stance.286 The order allows companies in disputes with Intel to continue
to receive relevant information except where the customer elects to seek
an injunction against Intel's manufacture, use, sale, offer to sell, or im-
portation of Intel's microprocessors. 287 The order is also careful to pro-
tect Intel's legitimate intellectual property rights. Intel is not required to
continue providing information or products with respect to the
microprocessors that the customer is seeking to enjoin.288 In addition,
Intel may withhold information for legitimate business reasons, such as a
breach of the disclosure agreement.289
The Intel settlement is important to maintaining competition in sev-
eral areas. The order has the effect of defining an abuse of monopoly
282 15 U.SC. § 2 (1999).
283 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1996).
284 See In re Intel Corp., 1999 FTC LEXIS 145, at *1 (Aug. 3, 1999) (decision and
order).
285 See id. at *10-*I1.
286 See id. *12-*13.
287 See id.
288 See id.
289 See id.
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power as the use of that power to extract proprietary, legally-protected
intellectual property from potential competitors. Otherwise, a dominant
firm in a high tech industry could use its current market power to extend
its dominance to complementary products and to next generation prod-
ucts. For instance, as the selling of PCs becomes more commoditized,
there is a danger that an Intel could own the only valuable brand in the
industry. Thus, Intel might come to dominate an even larger market than
microprocessors.
2. Microsoft
The Justice Department's complaint against Microsoft, the second
example of a dominant firm in desk top computer markets, is still in
litigation at the District Court level, at the time of this writing.290 The
complaint alleges abuse of monopoly power in the market for desktop
IBM-compatible operating systems ("PC systems").291 Microsoft makes
the Windows operating system, which has a large share of the world
market for PC operating systems.292 However, Microsoft's monopoly
power over PC operating systems is threatened by Netscape's Internet
browser, which can be used to distribute Sun Java, which in turn enables
software programs to run on any operating system.293
Several key features of this market reinforce Microsoft's monopoly
power in PC operating systems. First, there is an "applications barrier to
entry" into the operating systems market.294 Software products provide
the ends that support the means, the operating system. Without the appli-
cations software, there would be substantially diminished demand for the
operations software. Second, operating systems are subject to substantial
network effects. As the number of users of any operating system in-
creases, the consumer demand for the operating system increases too.295
At some point in the past, the demand for PC operating systems tipped in
Microsoft's favor, creating substantial barriers to entry into this market,
resulting in the acquisition of market power by Microsoft.
The Justice Department's claim is that Microsoft has abused its
dominant power in the PC operating systems market in an attempt to gain
dominance in the complementary market for Internet browsers, as well to
290 The most recent activity in the case was the release of findings of fact, see United
States v. Microsoft, 65 F.Supp.2d 1 (1999), and the conclusions of law on April 3, 2000, see
87 F.Supp.2d 30 (2000).
291 See Microsoft, 65 F.Supp.2d, at 3-6. Twenty states filed a similar complaint that has
merged with the United States' case against Microsoft. See New York v. Microsoft Corp., 65
F.Supp.2d 1 (1999).
292 See Microsoft, 65 F.Supp.2d at 4, 24.
293 See id. at 21.
294 See id. at 10-11.
295 See id. at 11 (explaining how these network effects enhance the barriers to entry.).
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maintain its dominance in the operating systems market. For example,
Microsoft allegedly requires computer manufacturers, in order to receive
a license for Microsoft's Windows operating system, to agree not to re-
move Microsoft's Internet browser from the computers or not to allow a
more prominent display of any rival browser.296 Microsoft has also re-
fused to list Internet service providers on its Windows display screen or
in its Internet service providers referral system unless the providers with-
hold information about other browsers and adopt proprietary standards
that make Microsoft's browser work better than competitive
browsers.297
The court rejected Microsoft's three defense claims: 1) that its activ-
ities in bundling its Internet browser with its Windows operating system
are efficient and procompetitive; 2) that putting both features in one
product improves the functioning of both the operating system and the
applications products written for the operating system; and 3) that its
contracts with the Internet service providers are nothing more than indus-
try-common cross-promotional agreements.298
One of the most important aspects of both Intel and Microsoft cases
is the speed and efficiency with which they were litigated. Again, the
legacy of the antitrust monopolization cases from the 1970s was that sev-
eral years would transpire before the cases even went to trial. Since
many of these cases involved technology markets, the anticompetitive
problems were often cured before the case went to trial. The antitrust
agencies had taken these lessons seriously and acted accordingly. The
Intel case was ready to go to trial less than nine months after it was filed.
The Microsoft trial started within five months after it was filed.
Although antitrust trials are costly and time-consuming, the agencies
have focused their priorities to move these litigations in a timely and
effective manner.
1I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION POLICY
The antitrust agencies, of course, can only litigate a small number of
the total antitrust cases. Private litigants bring much of the cases. Be-
yond bringing cases, the antitrust agencies serve an important role in
providing guidance about antitrust practices to the private bar and busi-
nesses. They provide guidance through a variety of mechanisms includ-
ing business review letters, staff opinion letters, guidelines on specific
subjects, and even amicus briefs. 299 Beyond that, the antitrust agencies
can play an important role in developing competition policy more gener-
296 See id. at 35.
297 See id. at 41.
298 See id. at 44-50.
299 See supra Part I.D.4.
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ally through a variety of mechanisms, including advocacy before regula-
tory agencies, participation in administration task forces, and reports to
Congress. During the Clinton Administration, the antitrust agencies have
been playing a more prominent role in developing policy and providing
guidance.
A. THE FTC GLOBAL COMPETITION HEARINGS.
Soon after Robert Pitofsky became FTC Chairman, he announced
that the FTC would conduct a series of hearings on global competi-
tion.300 The goal was a broad ranging reassessment of antitrust policy in
light of how both globalization and technology developments were trans-
forming the nature of competition. 301 Those hearings focused on how
competition had changed and whether antitrust rules needed to be ad-
justed accordingly.30 2 The FTC held 23 days of hearings and heard over
86 witnesses, including government regulators, academics, business per-
sons, and representatives from the private bar. The FTC issued a report
in May, 1996, Anticipating the 21s" Century: Competition Policy in the
New High Tech Global Marketplace.30 3 The report discussed a variety of
issues, including:
The changing nature of competition - the report docu-
mented that the increase in the intensity of high tech
competition is changing in important respects the way
the world does its business.
The Globalization of Competition - the report noted that
vastly increased world trade has significant antitrust
implications.
Efficiencies - the report focused and accelerated the de-
bate on the treatment of efficiencies in merger enforce-
ment and more generally in antitrust policy.
Other issues - the report touched on a wide range of
other antitrust issues including the failing firm defense,
definition of relevant geographic market, and a preview
of areas that deserve or require future attention, such as
the definition of innovation markets at the intersection of
antitrust and intellectual property and competitive effects
of networks and standards.
300 See FrC, Press Release, FTC Announces Hearings on Antitrust and Consumer Protec-
tions Laws in Global High-Tech Economy (visited Mar. 24, 2000) < http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
1995/9507/hearingl.htm>.
301 See id.
302 See FTC Staff Report, supra note 140.
303 See id.
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The hearings reflected a general consensus that the traditional core
of antitrust - hostility to cartels, need to control abuses of monopoly
power, prudent merger enforcement - has served the country well and
requires no drastic change.304 Rather, the report focused on aspects of
antitrust that may require adjustment in the light of changing competitive
conditions. 305
B. GUIDELINES.
One of the important functions of the agencies in providing gui-
dance is the issuance of guidelines on various business practices. The
Antitrust Division began this process back during the Johnson Adminis-
tration when the first merger guidelines were issued.30 6 This process was
accelerated during the Reagan Administration where the merger guide-
lines were revised and additional guidelines were issued on vertical re-
straints and international operations. 307 Although the merger guidelines
have received general praise for putting merger analysis on a sound theo-
retical foundation, the other guidelines were less favorably received. The
vertical restraint guidelines were condemned by Congress as being a trial
court brief attempting to move the law.308 The international guidelines309
were similarly criticized for being far broader than their supposed focus
on international competition and for attempting to rewrite the law in a
variety of other areas. 310
During the Clinton Administration a number of different guidelines
have been issued. First, the international guidelines were reissued to fo-
cus strictly on international jurisdiction issues.311 Second, and perhaps
the most important, guidelines on intellectual property licensing were is-
sued.312 These guidelines were initiated at the Justice Department and
304 See id.
305 See id.
306 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1968 MERGER GUIDELtNEs, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,101.
307 See 1982 MERGER GurDF.Lms, supra note 5; 1984 MERGER GutDELqES, supra note
137; VERTCAL RnsRAn GUIDELINES, supra note 190; DEPARTMENT OF JusncE 1988 ANn-
TRUST G uDELm's FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,109, [ hereinafter INTERNATIONAL GuIDELNEs].
308 H.R. 2965, 99"h Cong., § 605 (1985) ("Whereas such policy guidelines are inconsistent
with established antitrust law.. .be it resolved that it is the view of Congress that the antitrust
enforcement policy guidelines stated in "Vertical Restraints Guidelines". . .should be recalled
by the Attorney General.").
309 See INTERNATIONAL GUIIDELInS, supra note 308.
310 See Donald I. Baker & Bennet Rushkoff, The 1988 Justice Department Guidelines:
Searching for Legal Standards and Reassurance, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 405 (1990).
311 See Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, reprinted in, 59 Fed. Reg., 52,810 (draft). The official
guidelines were adopted in April of 1995, (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/internat.htm>.
312 See INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY GUIDELmES, supra note 69.
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were adopted both by the DOJ and FTC. The guidelines have estab-
lished a number of important principles that try to clarify the law on the
antitrust treatment of intellectual property.
One of the more controversial antitrust issues during the Clinton
Administration has been the antitrust treatment of health care arrange-
ments. In response to controversy in this area, the FTC and the DOJ
have issued three sets of guidelines on health care arrangements. The
guidelines issued in 1993 provided general guidance primarily about co-
operative arrangements among health care providers.313 These were ex-
panded in 1994 with further guidelines that addressed the additional
issues of hospital joint ventures, providers' collective provision of fee-
related information to purchasers of health care services, and multipro-
vider networks (e.g., combinations of hospitals and physicians). 314 The
controversy on the treatment of antitrust and health care remained un-
abated, and in 1996 there were several legislative proposals to provide
greater antitrust immunity for healthcare providers who wished to negoti-
ate jointly. In response to these proposals the antitrust agencies once
again revised their guidelines to make it clear that a wide variety of col-
lective activity would not raise antitrust concerns. 315
In the merger area, the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines316 have
generally gone without a great deal of challenge. As described earlier,
based on concerns raised in the 1995 global competition hearings, how-
ever, the antitrust agencies revised the efficiencies section of the guide-
lines in May 1997.3 17 The antitrust enforcement agencies were
concerned that the earlier treatment of efficiencies was too narrow and
unsympathetic to the potential efficiencies that could arise.
Besides guidelines, an important function of the antitrust agencies is
to provide guidance to specific businesses about contemplated business
practices. The FTC and the Antitrust Division have different procedures
in place. The Antitrust Division has a business review procedure and the
FTC provides what are known as staff opinion letters. These procedures
were not used often in the early 1990s mostly because the agencies often
did not respond in a timely fashion.318
313 See Enforcement Statements in the Health Care Area, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1
13,151 (1993).
314 See Statement of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Health
Care and Antitrust, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,152 (1994).
315 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,153 (1996). For a description of the evolution of these guidelines, see David A. Balto,
Cooperating to Compete: Antitrust Analysis of Health Care Joint Ventures, 42 ST. Louis L.
191 (Winter 1998).
316 1992 HoizoTrAL MERGER Gui naws, supra note 51.
317 See 1997 HouzoNrht MERGER GuiDELmES, supra note 141.
318 In one case it took the Antitrust Division over four years to issue a business review
letter. By that time the business that had requested the letter had gone out of business
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With the issuance of the Health Care Guidelines, 319 both agencies
committed to respond to requests for staff opinions and advice within 90-
120 days. Based on that commitment, the number of advisory opinions
issues by the two agencies increased substantially over the past few
years.320
C. AMICUS CURIAE PARTICIPATION
An important aspect of the antitrust agencies is participation as an
amicus in private antitrust litigation. Both agencies have intervened in
this fashion in order to inform the courts about various issues of antitrust
law.321
At the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the DOJ had a par-
ticularly aggressive amicus program. Through that program it sought to
provide greater clarity to the economic analysis behind various types of
anticompetitive conduct. Although much of the program was successful,
the Democratic-controlled Congress did not favor it. When in 1984 the
DOJ filed an amicus brief before the Supreme Court asking the Court to
rescind the per se illegality rule against resale price maintenance, 322 Con-
gress passed a rider to the Antitrust Division's appropriations preventing
it from arguing the case before the Court.323
The amicus program in the Clinton Administration, which tries to
clarify the law where appropriate, has taken a fairly balanced approach.
Besides the participation in State Oil v. Kahn,324 the agencies have been
involved in a number of other matters. Two examples of such involve-
ment are NYNEX v. Discon, Inc.325 in the Supreme Court, and Surgical
Care Center v. Hospital Service District326 in the Fifth Circuit.
1. NYNEX
In NYNEX, 327 Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous Court, ad-
dressed the question of "the applicability of the per se group boycott rule
where a single buyer favors one seller over another, albeit for an im-
proper reason. ' 328 The case arose from the aftermath of the break-up of
the Bell System in 1984. In order for the local operating companies to
319 See supra note 315.
320 See Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 10-year Workload Statistics Reports,
Fiscal Year 1990-1999 (visited May 2, 2000) <http:llwww.usdoj.govlatr/public14504.hm>.
321 See supra note 256.
322 See Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
323 H.R. 2965, 99' Cong., § 605 (1985).
324 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
325 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
326 171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
327 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
328 Id. at 133.
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provide to their customers the mandated access to long-distance compa-
nies competing with AT&T, old switching equipment often had to be
removed and new equipment installed. Discon sold removal services to a
NYNEX subsidiary, but filed suit alleging that NYNEX and its subsidi-
aries took actions that injured Discon and benefited a removal services
competitor, AT&T Technologies. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint, and the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal with one excep-
tion- an allegation that a NYNEX subsidiary switched its purchases
from Discon to AT&T Technologies as part of an attempt to hoodwink
regulators and overcharge customers.329 The Second Circuit revived this
allegation under a theory that it stated at least a cause of action under
§ l's rule of reason, 330 and possibly a per se violation, as a group boy-
cott.331 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider that
exception.332
The antitrust agencies filed an amicus brief expressing their concern
that per se rules may be over-extended to situations with ambiguous
competitive effects. 333 The Court concurred with the agencies' position.
The Supreme Court clarified that it will not treat a boycott as per se
illegal unless it involves a horizontal agreement, relying in part on the
Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics334 holding that vertical re-
straints are not illegal per se unless they include some agreement on
price or price levels. 335 The court reiterated the distinction between anti-
trust violations and business torts, even those involving "pure malice. ' '336
2. Surgical Care Center
In Surgical Care Center v. Hospital Service District,337 the question
was the scope of the "state action" exemption as applied to the actions of
a political subdivision of the state rather than the state acting as sover-
eign.338 The FTC's concern with application of the "state action" ex-
emption to political subdivisions of the state has generally come up in the
context of FTC's antitrust actions against state regulatory bodies. 339
329 93 F.3d 1055, 1063-64 (2nd Cir. 1996).
330 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
331 See id. at 1061.
332 523 U.S. 1019.
333 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in
Support of Vacating the Judgment, NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 123 (1998).
334 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988).
335 See NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 136.
336 Id. at 137.
337 171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
338 See id. at 234.
339 See, e.g., In re Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, 110 FTC. 549
(1988); FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co, 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
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In Surgical Care Center, a panel of the Fifth Circuit initially upheld
the district court. The Fifth Circuit found that the authorizing state legis-
lation invoked by the hospital district exempting its alleged antitrust vio-
lations satisfied the Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire340 test as to
whether the state had shown a "policy to displace competition. '341
These earlier decisions had relied on a statute that merely enabled the
hospital district to enter into joint ventures and conduct closed meet-
ings-to act in those regards like a private business entity-in order to
put it on an equal competitive footing with private businesses. The FTC
and the Antitrust Division, as enforcement agencies, had serious con-
cerns with such a stunningly broad reading of the state legislation. The
en banc court shared these concerns, and reached the conclusion that a
statute intended to authorize a government agency to act like a business
didn't contemplate that it would act like a business that was violating the
antitrust laws.342
Im. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PROCESS
Antitrust agencies are administrative bodies, and one of the impor-
tant aspects of antitrust enforcement is improving the process of those
agencies. Antitrust investigations can impose significant burdens on
businesses, both in terms of compliance with information requests and in
delays in proposed business conduct, such as mergers. Antitrust agencies
face ever-increasing challenges and demands on the increasingly limited
enforcement resources. For these reasons, the agencies have looked criti-
cally at their enforcement process to find more efficient and effective
means of utilizing their resources. Three examples are the Hart-Scott-
Rodino ("HSR") 343 merger process, merger divestitures, and the FTC's
administrative adjudication process.
A. MANAGING THE HSR PRocEss.
The premerger notification process established by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act in 1976 is a cornerstone of modern merger enforcement.344
The Act provides timely notification to the antitrust agencies of proposed
mergers and acquisitions, 345 so the agencies can review a proposed trans-
action for possible competitive problems,346 and provides a waiting pe-
340 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
341 Surgical Care Center, 153 F.3d 220,224 (5h Cir. 1998), rev'd. en banc, 171 F.3d 231
(5' Cir. 1999), cert. filed, Aug. 2, 1999.
342 See Surgical Care Center, 171 F.3d at 234-35.
343 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (codified in pertinent part at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1999)).
344 See Clayton Act, § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1999).
345 See id. § 18a(a), (b).
346 See id.
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riod before the transaction can proceed to give the agencies sufficient
time to review a transaction and, if necessary, initiate action to resolve
competitive problems before they arise.347 The HSR program has been
hugely successful in achieving its statutory objectives to give the anti-
trust agencies a meaningful opportunity to review and, if necessary, chal-
lenge anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions before they occur, and to
preserve a meaningful opportunity for effective relief. Pre-HSR history
demonstrated that post-consummation merger challenges took an inordi-
nate amount of time to resolve, were costly, and often ended in ineffec-
tive relief even if the court ruled for the government at trial - it was too
difficult to "unscramble the eggs" and restore effective competition. 348
To remain a useful enforcement tool, however, the HSR program must
be administered with care.
Undeniably, the HSR process can impose significant burdens on
businesses. The premerger rules are complicated, and may require the
submission of a considerable amount of information in the second re-
quest phase. But the appropriate question is whether the premerger re-
quirements are reasonably necessary in light of the agencies'
enforcement responsibilities and the resulting consumer benefit. For the
most part, the burdens imposed by HSR are fundamental to the process
and are unavoidable if HSR is to achieve its statutory objectives. None-
theless, government has a self-imposed obligation to minimize those bur-
dens, and to eliminate any unnecessary burdens. Careful management of
the HSR process, therefore, is a core function of the antitrust agencies.
During the early days of the Clinton Administration, then-FTC
Chairman Janet Steiger and Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman
announced an ambitious set of policy initiatives aimed at addressing con-
cerns about the HSR process. 349 Those reforms included:
Development of proposals to increase the number of
transactions exempt from HSR requirements;
Adoption of procedures to expedite the clearance
process;
Issuance of a joint FTC/DOJ model second request; 350
347 See id.
348 For a review of the HSR Act and its successes, see, e.g., William J. Baer, Reflections
on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTrrRUST L.J.
825 (Spring 1997).
349 See U.S. DnEARTmENr OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HART-Scorr-
RODINO PREMERGER PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTs (Mar. 23, 1995).
350 The HSR stays a merger for a certain period of time, usually 30 days. If, during ththat
period, the reviewing agency decides that it needs more information in order to determine if
the merger is likely to be anticompetitive, it may issue a request for additional information,
commonly called a "second request." The second request stays the consummation of the
merger for an additional 20 days from the date of substantial compliance with the second
request.
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Implementation of uniform procedures to review the
burden of second requests and to examine disputes as to
substantial compliance;
Adoption of a joint "quick look" policy for reviewing
HSR filings.
Below we discuss the agencies' records in building upon those ini-
tiatives, along with another core function, maintaining the integrity of the
HSR process.
1. Reducing Burdens Generally
Two problems have been identified over the years. The first prob-
lem is the number of transactions covered by HSR requirements. Critics
of the process have urged the expansion of HSR exemptions and raising
of HSR reporting thresholds. 351 The second problem is the time required
for the antitrust agencies to complete their review. These issues are dis-
cussed below.
a. Expanded HSR Exemptions and Higher Thresholds
Exempting transactions from HSR requirements has been a difficult
issue because the transactions with real competitive significance need to
be reported and examined prior to closing. Although relatively few
transactions present serious competitive concerns, it is usually impossi-
ble to determine the competitive ramifications of any particular transac-
tion until it is reviewed, because merger analysis is very fact-specific and
case-specific. Therefore, it is necessary to review a large number of
transactions to find the relative few that are problematic.
The agencies have remained open to promulgating exemptions from
HSR requirements, but have proceeded cautiously. Broad exemptions
from HSR requirements are not practical, because it is exceptionally dif-
ficult to specify what should be -exempt. There have been two major
expansions of HSR exemptions since the premerger rules were imple-
mented.352 The first was in 1979, three years after the HSR Act became
law, and only one year after the implementing rules came into effect.353
The FTC, with the concurrence of the Department of Justice, revised
section 802.20 of the rules to exempt a large number of very small trans-
actions.354 A review of the first year's experience under the premerger
351 Responding to such criticism, several bills have been introduced in the current Con-
gress to raise HSR thresholds. For example, Congressman Rogan introduced the "Small Busi-
ness Merger Fee Reduction Act of 2000." H.R. 4194, 10 6' Cong. (App. 5, 2000).352 There have been other amendments, in 1983 and 1987, to clarify and refine the pre-
merger rules.
353 See 44 Fed. Reg. 66,781 (Nov. 21, 1979) (codified as amended, 16 C.F.R § 802.20).
354 See id. at 66,782.
120 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC PoLIcY
rules indicated that those transactions were unlikely to raise any antitrust
concerns.355 The revised rule decreased the number of required filings
by about 20%.356
The second major expansion of HSR exemptions took place during
the Clinton Administration. The FTC, with the concurrence of the De-
partment of Justice, formally adopted five amendments to the premerger
rules that broadened the classes of transactions exempt from HSR re-
quirements. 357 One purpose of the amendments was to clarify the re-
quirements and broaden the class of acquisitions exempt from HSR
requirements as transfers of goods or realty in the "ordinary course of
business. '358 Other rules exempted form HSR requirements the acquisi-
tions of certain categories of real property assets,359 the acquisitions of
oil and natural gas reserves valued at $500 million or less,3 60 the acquisi-
tions of coal reserves valued at $200 million or less, 361 and the acquisi-
tions of securities whose underlying value is represented solely by those
kinds of exempt assets.362 Those acquisitions are unlikely to violate the
antitrust laws. Another rule exempted acquisitions by certain investors
of rental real property. Those transactions likewise are not likely to vio-
late the antitrust laws.
These new exemptions eliminated the filing requirement for up to
10% of the transactions that would have been reportable under the previ-
ous rules. This results in substantial saving of time and money for cer-
tain businesses. Despite such efforts to reduce the number of filings,
there is some criticism that the Act requires the reporting of too many
transactions.3 63 This is a serious public policy issue, and there are some
legitimate arguments on both sides. Any modifications of the thresholds
should be drafted carefully to avoid undermining the public interest in
effective antitrust enforcement.
b. Expedited Inter-Agency Clearance.
One significant issue the FTC and the Department of Justice have
faced over the years is the amount of time it takes for the two agencies to
355 See Malcolm R. Pfunder, Premerger Notification After One Year: An FTC Staff Per-
spective, 48 ANTrRuST L.J. 1487, 1490-91 (1979).
356 See id. at 1491 (stating that changes, "would have eliminated about 20 percent of the
filings received... about the first of April of 1979.").
357 See 61 Fed. Reg. 13,666 (Mar.28, 1996) (codified as amended, 16 CFR §§ 802.1,
802.2, 802.3, 802.4, 802.5, 802.15).
358 Id. at 13,668.
359 See id. at 13,674-678.
360 See id. at 13,678.
361 See id.
362 See id. at 13,679.
363 See generally Symposium: Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger Enforcement,
65 ArNrusT L.J. 813 (1997).
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decide jurisdiction over a transaction. That process is called "clearance,"
and given the short period allowed for HSR investigations, a timely deci-
sion as to which agency will investigate is critical. Most transactions are
cleared quickly to one agency or the other. However, where both agen-
cies have an interest in investigating a transaction, it may take some time
to determine which agency is best suited to the task. At the outset of
theClinton Administration, there was growing concern that the FTC and
the DOJ were taking too long to resolve the issue which agency will
conduct the investigation. Lack of a timely resolution imposed unneces-
sary delay on the parties and reduced the time available for staff to con-
duct the initial review of the transaction.
The agencies acknowledged the problem and implemented new pro-
cedures that substantially shortened the average time for resolving clear-
ance in April, 1995.364 The faster clearance has benefited both the
agencies and merging parties. The agencies have benefited by having
more time for investigation during the initial waiting period, resulting in
more focused investigations and better-informed decisions on whether to
issue a second request. First, in some cases the agencies can complete
their initial review and grant early termination of the HSR waiting period
at an earlier date than was previously possible. In fiscal year 1998, for
example, 69% of the transactions were granted early termination of the
waiting period, and the average time was 15.8 days to early termina-
tion.365 Second, earlier clearance allows the agencies to resolve potential
competitive concerns without resorting to the second request process
nearly as often. As shown below, only one to two percent of the transac-
tions receive requests for additional information; the remainder are
cleared to proceed within 30 days. 3 6 6 Consequently, premerger review is
more efficient. The clearance process still encounters occasional delays,
but overall the process has been significantly improved.
2. Reduction of Second Request Burdens
The burden of responding to requests for additional information is
another issue the agencies have addressed. In part, the improvement is
the result of the above-described improvements in the clearance process.
As a result of having more time for investigation during the initial 30-day
waiting period, there is less need to issue requests for additional informa-
364 See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, Federal Trade Commission Announces
New Joint Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger Review Procedures with the Department of Justice, Mar.
23, 1995.
365 See 1998 HSR ANN. REP. (visited May 2, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/98annrpt/
hsr98annual.htm>.
366 The FTC's goal under the Government Performance and Results Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (1999), is to keep the average time from filing to completion of the review for all
transactions to less than 20 days.
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tion. For example, as shown in the following table, during the fiscal
years 1996-98, the FTC issued significantly fewer second requests as a
percentage of reportable transactions compared to the previous three-year
period.
FTC SECOND REQUESTS
FY 1993-98
Adjusted FTC Second Second Requests/
Year Transactions* Requests Adjusted Transactions
1993 1,745 40 2.2%
1994 2,128 46 2.2%
1995 2,612 58 2.2%
1996 2,864 36 1.3%
1997 3,438 45 1.3%
1998 4,575 46 1.0%
* Adjusted transactions exclude those that are not subject to requests for additional information,
including incomplete filings and non-reportable transactions.
In addition to reducing the relative frequency of issuing second re-
quests, the agencies have reduced burdens on parties that receive them.
The FTC's Bureau of Competition has made various efforts through the
years to keep these burdens to reasonable levels, including using a "quick
look" approach, model second requests, and at one time, appointing a
second request "czar" to review second requests before they went to the
Chairman's Office with a recommendation for issuance. In the mid-
1990s, the agencies made further efforts to reduce the second-request
burden through the development of an annotated, uniform model second
request for both agencies. The goal was to achieve greater consistency
between the two agencies, and to decrease burdens on reporting
companies.
Since the adoption of the uniform model, there has been an overall
reduction in document production burden in second requests. The some-
times-expressed perception that second requests invariably require a
massive document production is not correct- some do, but those are the
minority. In fiscal year 1998, at the FTC almost 50% of second requests
resulted in productions less than 20 boxes for both parties combined, and
over 70% had productions smaller than 50 boxes. 367
In conjunction with the new model, the FTC has continued to use,
whenever possible, a "quick look" policy that encourages document pro-
duction in stages, focusing initially on issues that may be determinative
in concluding that the transaction likely does not raise competitive
367 See Parker, Report, supra note 49, at 4.
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problems. If the FTC can reach that conclusion based on a quick look,
full document production is not necessary. A related benefit of a reduced
burden of document production is that parties can respond to second re-
quests more quickly. There has been an overall reduction in the time
between issuance of the second request and substantial compliance,
although, again, some merging parties still take considerable time to
comply.
Perhaps the best measure of whether the HSR process is being man-
aged effectively is comparing the number of second requests to the
number of enforcement actions. The FTC secures relief in the vast ma-
jority of cases in which it issues a second request. Of course, bringing
enforcement actions in 100% of our second requests would not be an
appropriate measure of success, since in some cases issues can only be
resolved based on information gathered in the second request.
The statistics demonstrate that the agencies are becoming even more
diligent and select carefully the cases for second request review. The
FTC has become even more proficient at issue identification and infor-
mation gathering during the initial 30-day period. In addition, in many
cases the parties have provided significant assistance by supplying the
necessary information to avoid a second request. Thus, second requests
are increasingly utilized only in the few cases that are necessary.
3. HSR Enforcement
The agencies also have stepped up enforcement against violations of
the HSR. This is another element of the program to maintain and im-
prove HSR as an effective enforcement tool. The success of the pre-
merger notification program depends critically upon compliance. Since
there can be strong incentives to avoid reporting certain transactions, it is
important to prevent those incentives from determining the behavior of
merging parties. Congress wisely provided for significant civil penalties
for non-compliance-now $11,000 for each day a firm is in violation, 368
which can amount to millions in penalties before it is over.
Nonetheless, there have been some problems with various kinds of
non-compliance, some inadvertent, some intentional. The FTC has taken
vigorous action where it was warranted. In 1996, for example, the FTC
collected record civil penalties in excess of $7.5 million for violations of
HSR with respect to three transactions.3 69 During the three years from
FY 96 through FY 98, the FTC obtained consent judgments totaling
$13.9 million, almost 44% of the total collected during the 21 year his-
368 See Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 31101(s)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 nt. (1999)).
369 See FEDERAL TRADE CoMInssIoN, BuREmu OF COMPETMITON, ENFORCEMENT AcrVI-
TiEs, FIscAL YEAR 1996-MAR.31, 2000, 27-29.
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tory of the program.370 A few examples will illustrate some of the
problems encountered thus far.
PERCENT OF SECOND REQUESTS THAT RESULT IN
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS*
Fiscal Year 95 (34/58) 58.6%
Fiscal Year 96 (23/36) 63.9%
Fiscal Year 97 (24/45) 53.3%
Fiscal Year 98 (31/46) 67.4%
Fiscal Year 99 Year to date (12/14) 85.7%
TOTAL (124/199 62.3%
In United States v. Sara Lee Corp.,371 FTC staff found reason to
believe the acquiring firm had deliberately understated the value of U.S.
assets it was acquiring (Kiwi Brands) in order to avoid reporting a highly
problematic transaction. The agency found out about the acquisition af-
ter the fact, and investigated both the merger and the failure to comply
with HSR. In 1994, Sara Lee agreed to a divestiture order to resolve a
probable violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act.372 In February, 1996, Sara
Lee agreed to pay a then-record $3.1 million civil penalty to settle
charges that it violated the HSR Act.373
In United States v. Automatic Data Processing Inc.,3 7 4 the issue was
whether the company had complied with the reporting form.375 Item 4(c)
of the reporting form requires merging parties to turn over documents
prepared by or for the parties for purposes of analyzing the transac-
tion.376 Thus, 4(c) documents can quickly reinforce or contradict com-
petitive concerns that investigators might have, or alert them to some that
might otherwise be missed. 377 In 1995, Automatic Data Processing
370 See id.
371 See In re Kiwi Brands, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,894 (Sept. 23, 1994). See also Federal Trade
Commission, Press Release, Sara Lee Agrees to Pay Record Civil Penalty to Settle Charges
Over Shoe Care Product Acquisition, Feb. 6, 1996 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:ll
www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/9602/sara.htm>.
372 See In re Kiwi Brands, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,894 (Sept. 23, 1994).
373 See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, supra note 372.
374 124 FTC 456 (Oct. 24, 1997). The matter was placed before an administrative law
judge in November of 1996, however the action was removed to the FTC on May 22, 1997 on
a motion by both parties. See , 62 Fed. Reg. 34,293, 32, 294 (June 25, 1997) (proposed
consent agreement).
375 See Automatic Data Processing Inc., FTC Complaint (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://
www.ftc.gov/os/1996/961 1/d9282cmp.htm>.
376 See Federal Trade Commission, PremergerlHart-Scott-Rodino Form, (visited Mar.
24, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsrform.htm>.
377 Congressman Rodino recognized the critical importance of these kinds of documents
when he sought passage of the premerger notification act that bears his name, "[T]he govern-
ment will be requesting the very data that is already available to merging parties, and has
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Inc.("ADP") submitted an HSR filing without any 4(c) documents.378
After the transaction had been closed, the agency received complaints
from the public that the acquisition had caused competitive harm. The
discovery in the ensuing investigation revealed documents that clearly
should have been filed under 4(c). The federal court complaint against
ADP alleged that the HSR filing had been materially deficient, and that
ADP failed to take the 4(c) requirement seriously. 379 ADP agreed to
settle those charges for $2.97 million.380 This represented $10,000 per
day for each day ADP had failed to submit the 4(c) documents (the maxi-
mum daily penalty at the time)381- up to the time the company submit-
ted the documents and recertified its premerger notification. The
investigation also uncovered evidence substantiating the concerns that
ADP's acquisition was anticompetitive.382
Automatic Data Processing Inc., is not an isolated incident.383
Some HSR filings do not contain the kinds of 4(c) documents that one
already been assembled and analyzed by them. If the parties are prepared to rely on it, all of it
should be available to the Government." 122 CONG. REc. H10293 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976)
(statement of Rep. Rodino).
378 See Automatic Data Processing Inc., FTC Complaint, supra note 376 [ 6,7.
379 See id.
380 See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, ADP Settles FTC Charges Over
Autoinfo Acquisition, June 18, 1997 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.govlopa/19971
9706/adpauto3.htm>.
381 See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g)(1) (1999).
382 The Commission later issued a decision against ADP under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act, including charges that ADP attempted to monopolize, and
did in fact monopolize, a market for automobile salvage yard information systems. See 124
FTC 456 (Oct. 24, 1997).
383 For example, in 1997, the FTC obtained a consent judgment of over $5.6 million - the
highest civil penalty amount ever obtained under the HSR Act for a single transaction - against
Mahle GmbH, a German automotive and diesel engine parts manufacturer with businesses in
the United States, and Metal Leve, S.A., a competing Brazilian manufacturer, for their failure
to file a premerger notification. See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC Obtains
$5.6 Million from German and Brazilian Piston Manufacturers for Failure to File for U.S.
Antitrust Review; Civil Penalty is Largest Ever, June 19, 1997 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:ll
www.ftc.govlopal1997/9706/mmlcivp4.htm>. The complaint alleged that both firms knew
that their deal posed serious antitrust problems yet they completed the transaction knowing
that they were violating the HSR Act. See FTC Complaint, (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:ll
www.ftc.govlos/1997/9706/mahlecmp.htm>. According to the complaint, each of the two
firms "consulted with U.S. counsel or U.S. investment bankers and were apprized of the re-
quirement under the HSR Act that they each file Notification and Report Forms with U.S.
antitrust authorities." Id. at 18. In fact, the complaint alleges that each firm had "considered
ignoring the HSR reporting requirements" and treating the HSR reporting obligation "as a
trade off between the costs of compliance with the Act and the potential risks of noncompli-
ance with the Act." Id. 20.
More recently, in the spring of 1999, the FTC obtained a $2.785 million, the maximum
available, consent judgment against Blackstone Capital Partners II Merchant Banking Fund LP
in connection with its acquisition of Prime Succession, Inc. See Federal Trade Commission,
Press Release, Merchant Banking Firm, Partner Settle FTC Charges from Incomplete Pre-
Merger Report, Mar. 30, 1999 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9903/
blackst.htm>. Moreover, for the first time, the agency required an official of the company to
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would ordinarily expect from companies engaged in complex transac-
tions in which the firms may be engaged in the same or related busi-
nesses. Sometimes, these documents show up only in response to a
second request, and that late arrival is not considered timely compliance.
If firms do not file those documents in response to Item 4(c) of the initial
notification, and second requests are not issued, and the antitrust agen-
cies may never discover those documents unless third parties come for-
ward complaining about the merger, as was the case in Automatic Data
Processing Inc. Accordingly, the antitrust enforcement agencies have
made it a high priority to ensure that filing persons comply fully with
Item 4(c).
The HSR Act was passed because it is difficult or even impossible
to obtain effective antitrust relief after parties have merged their opera-
tions. In order to preserve the possibility of effective remedies for an-
ticompetitive transactions, the Act establishes strict waiting periods
during which the antitrust agencies may conduct their premerger review
of all proposed transactions. 384 Parties must wait until the period expires
or is terminated by the agencies before they may proceed with their
transactions.
Finally, while the FTC generally has not sought penalties for first-
time negligent violations, a recent case suggests that it will not look the
other way when a company clearly should have realized its filing obliga-
tion. In 1998, the FTC obtain a consent judgment for a $500,000 civil
penalty against Loewen Group, Inc., for its failure to make an HSR filing
in its acquisition of Prime Succession, Inc.385 In this case, Loewen was
an experienced acquirer intimately familiar with the HSR process, and it
knew that the acquisition it planned - one of the three largest funeral
home chains buying the fourth largest, which operated in many of the
pay a civil penalty as well. See id. The Blackstone case involved a failure to file a 4(c)
document. See FTC Complaint, No. 1: 99C V00975, 1999 FTC LEXIS 73. Blackstone's
request for early termination of the waiting period was granted and only after the merger was
consummated did the FTC learn of a competitive problem. The FTC also required the pay-
ment of a civil penalty from the Blackstone official who certified the filing as "true, complete
and correct" and was one of the authors of the 4(c) document that Blackstone failed to submit.
See id. 40-47. There were a number of reasons for holding the individual liable. The
investigation revealed that this official had primary responsibility for negotiating the underly-
ing deal, knew it might raise antitrust questions, and knew that delaying the deal could jeop-
ardize its closing. Moreover, he was one of the authors of the critical 4(c) document, knew of
its importance to Blackstone's decision-making, and had a copy of it in his files. Finally,
when questioned on Blackstone's failure to provide the document, he gave inconsistent an-
swers. Therefore, the investigators were convinced that he knew or should have known that
the filing was not 'true, complete and correct."
384 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (1999).
385 In re Loewen Group, 122 F.T.C. 22 (July 29, 1996). See also Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Press Release, Loewen Group Agrees to Pay $500,000 Civil Penalty to Settle Federal
Charges of Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Violations, Mar. 31, 1998 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:ll
www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9803/loewen.htm>.
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same markets - would receive antitrust attention. Further, Loewen's fail-
ure to file may have had something to do with the fact that the company
faced a deadline to close the deal and the loss of a large down payment if
it did not meet that deadline.
B. DrvsTrruRE PRocEss
In the past few years the process of divesture has been an area of
considerable attention on the part of the antitrust enforcement agencies
because most merger challenges are resolved through an agreement in
which the parties consent to divest certain assets. Over the past few
years there has been renewed attention to assuring that divestitures ade-
quately restore competition. There was a perception by the private bar
and business community that the agencies were primarily focused on
bringing cases and paid less attention to whether or not the remedy in a
particular case was adequate. The true test of success is not the number
of settlements negotiated but whether the divestitures they called for
promptly restored competition to effective markets. From the agencies'
prospective, divestitures took too long, averaging typically well in excess
of a year, and many failed to achieve their remedial purpose.
In 1995, the FTC staff began a study of divestiture orders issued
from fiscal years 1990 through 1994. The study was released in August,
1999.386 This was the first systematic analysis of the FTC divestiture
orders since the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notification
Act in the 1970s.38 7 The staff reviewed 35 consent orders and conducted
interviews in a case study format.388 The report discussed factors that
made divestitures more or less successful and recommended how to
make divestitures more effective. 389 The experience reflected in this re-
port provides a clear framework for understanding and changing the
FTC's divestiture process.
Perhaps the most important change is the requirement that parties
identify buyers in advance of accepting a divestiture settlement.390 The
FTC now routinely insists upon finding up-front buyers as a part of every
settlement. There are many advantages to identifying prospective buyers
up front. In cases where there are concerns about the adequacy of a
settlement, doing so allows the FTC to have some assurance that compe-
386 See FEDERAL TRADE COMISSION, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION'S DivEsTrrURE PRo-
cEss (Aug. 6, 1999) available from (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/os/1999199081
index.htm#6> [hereinafter FTC STUDY]. See also Federal Trade Commission, Press Release,
FTC Release Report on Commission's Divestiture Process, Aug. 6, 1999 (visited Mar. 24,
2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9908/divestreporhtm>.
387 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1999).
388 See FTC STUDY, supra note 386, at 7.
389 See id. at 15-38.
390 See Parker, Report, supra note 49, at 11.
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tition will in fact be restored. In other words, it allows the FTC to deter-
mine whether the package of assets has been "market tested" by
identifying a buyer with experience who believes those assets can ade-
quately restore competition. Additionally, identification of up-front buy-
ers allows quicker divestitures. Over the past three years the
Commission has used up-front buyers in approximately 60 percent of all
cases in which divestitures were required.391
In cases where an up-front buyer is not required, the FTC has also
significantly shortened the period of divestiture. Prior to 1995, the time
period for divestiture was typically twelve months, and with additional
time for public comment, that period often would extend for at least fif-
teen months.392 Although some assets may be very complex and take
some time to divest, a 12-month period was too long. Moreover, a long
divestiture period allowed respondents to treat their promised divestitures
as a low priority. Respondents would routinely file divestiture applica-
tions at the eleventh hour and these applications were often deficient. In
response to this, the FTC significantly shortened the standard divestiture
period. The period is now 4 months in most cases and is rarely more
than 6 months. 393 Moreover, the FTC has significantly improved its re-
view of divestiture applications so these applications are reviewed and
approved within a much shorter period of time.
The FTC began integrating the results of the Divestiture Study to
the divestiture process, as the study was ongoing. In response to some of
the concerns raised by the Divestiture Study, several changes were made
in the approach to divestitures including shorter divestiture periods, up-
front buyers, broader assets packages, and crown jewel provisions. 394 In-
clusion of such provisions is now the starting point in consent negotia-
tions. As a result of these changes, the average time from the date the
divestiture order is provisionally accepted and the date the Commission
approves the order of divestitures has dropped from 15 months in FY
1995 to 7 months in FY 1996 to approximately 3 months FY 1997. 395
Moreover, each of these changes has improved the ability of the party
acquiring the divested assets to adequately compete.
Ultimately, the critical factor in merger cases is identifying the ap-
propriate package of assets to be divested. The antitrust agencies are
typically less willing to accept divestitures of assets that are short of
391 See id.
392 See FrC Study, supra note 386, at 39.
393 See id.
394 A "crown jewel" is a set of assets valued by the divesting company higher than the
value placed on the assets to be divested. Thus, an order giving the trustee the power to divest
the crown jewel assets if the other assets are not successfully divested by a certain time will
provide the maximum incentive to complete the required divestiture in a timely fashion.
395 See FTC STuDY, supra note 386.
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ongoing business because the FTC found that relief short of complete
divestiture was often inadequate.396 For example, a licensing arrange-
ment requiring an ongoing relationship between the divested and divest-
ing parties often did not fully restore competition. Thus, the antitrust
agencies' approach is typically to move away from forms of behavioral
relief or licensing arrangements.
In addition, the antitrust agencies have been looking for broader as-
sets packages. Economies of scale and scope often require that comple-
mentary products be manufactured or sold with the products, thereby
raising competitive concerns. Therefore, the divestiture of a group of
assets that is broader than a particular business is often necessary to as-
sure the marketability, viability and competitiveness of the divestiture
package.
Many recent enforcement actions involve high technology busi-
nesses in which the divested assets are rather sophisticated. In addition,
in situations involving products such as pharmaceuticals, the party ac-
quiring the divested assets must go through a regulatory approval process
for their new product. To protect the divestiture process in these types of
the cases the FTC is increasingly using trustees to monitor the divestiture
process. During the period of divestiture it is important that someone
with knowledge of the industry monitors the divestiture efforts to ensure
that the seller is providing the needed assets and support, and the ac-
quirer is diligently pursuing the approval process to quickly restore com-
petition. Use of an interim trustee assures that the assets will remain
viable until they are put into full production.
However, the best-drafted orders the FTC can put together will be
of little use if cannot assure compliance. Consequently, the antitrust
agencies have insisted on very firm compliance enforcement policy.
Within the past 2 years the FTC has secured civil penalties of (1) $3
million from Schnuck's Markets for failure to maintain the value and
competitive viability of a group of stores it had agreed to divest; 397 (2)
$600,000 from CVS because it, like Schnuck, had failed to maintain ade-
quately some of the assets it had agreed to divest - before transferring the
pharmacies at issue to Eckerd, the divestiture purchaser, CVS had re-
moved its automated computer prescription system, creating big
problems for Eckerd in accessing customers' prescription records; 398 (3)
$900,000 from Rite-Aid to settle charges that it failed to divest three
396 See id. at 38.
397 See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, Mar. 27, 1998 (visited Mar. 24, 2000)
<http:llwww.ftc.govlopa/1998/9803/petapp20.98.htm>.
398 See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, CVS Agrees to Pay $600,000 Penalty
for Violating FTC Asset Maintenance Agreement, Mar. 27, 1998 (visited Mar. 24, 2000)
<http:lwww.ftc.gov/opal1998/9803Cvs.htm>.
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drug stores in Maine and New Hampshire under a 1994 order;399 and (4)
$2.5 million from Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation to settle
charges that it failed to divest hospitals in Utah and Florida in a timely
manner, failed to hold the Utah hospitals separate until divestiture, and
failed to carry out other obligations.4°°
C. ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION
The FTC is also an administrative body that adjudicates disputes
before its Administrative Law Judges ("AL"). Although administrative
litigation is an important tool, especially in novel areas that call upon the
unique expertise of the Commission, the pace of administrative litigation
at the FTC has often been criticized. 401 In the 1980s, cases would take
several years in pretrial disputes and the decisions by both the ALJs and
the FTC could also take several years.
To rectify the problem Chairman Pitofsky formed a task force,
under the leadership of then-General Counsel Stephen Calkins, to sug-
gest reforms of the administrative litigation process. The task force sug-
gested several reforms that were adopted by the Commission in
September 1996.402 The reforms established shorter deadlines, stream-
lined pre-trial discovery, and mandated speedier trials.40 3 In most cases,
the reforms required the administrative law judge to issue an initial deci-
sion within one year after the FTC filing of an administrative complaint.
The preliminary results are promising.
For example in the Toys 'R' Us case,404 sixteen months passed from
the issuance of the complaint in May 1996 to the decision of the adminis-
trative law judge in September 1997.405 This time included a very tough
discovery schedule, which produced more than 9500 pages of transcript
399 See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, Rite Aid to Pay $900,000 in Civil Pen-
alties for Failure to Divest Three Drug Stores in Maine and New Hampshire as Required
under FTC Agreement, Feb. 25, 1998 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/opa/1998/
9802/ritecp.htm>.
400 See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, Columbia/HCA to Pay $2.5 Million
Civil Penalty for FTC Order Violation, July 30, 1998 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:ll
www.ftc.gov/opal1998/9807/Columbia.htm>.
401 See Lopatka & Mongoven, supra note 4, at 174.
402 See 61 Fed. Reg. 50,640 (Sept. 26, 1996). Federal Trade Commission, Press Release,
FTC Announces a Set of Procedural Rule Changes Designed to Streamline Administrative
Trial Process, Sept. 18, 1996 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/opa/199619609/
adminlit.htn>.
403 Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC Announces a Set of Procedural Rule
Changes Designed to Streamline Administrative Trial Process, Sept. 18, 1996 (visited Mar.
24, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/l1996/9609/adminlit.htm>.
404 See supra Part I.D.3.
405 The case was litigated before the new procedural reforms were implemented, so the
12-month rule did not apply.
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and 2600 exhibits, forty-three days of hearings, and numerous mo-
tions.406 The result was a very thoughtful 126-page opinion.407
Although no case has yet been brought to an Initial Decision under
the 12-month rule, the procedural reforms have speeded pretrial proceed-
ings and led to more timely resolution of cases. For example, in the first
merger case litigated under the 12-month rule, In re Associated Data
Processing,40 8 the ALJ scheduled the trial to start about six months after
the complaint was filed. After about four months of pretrial proceedings,
and with trial imminent, the parties sought a settlement and the case was
removed from administrative litigation.40 9 The Commission approved
the consent order months after filing the complaint. The first antitrust
case for which trial has been completed under the rule, In re Summit
Technology, Inc.,410 presents a somewhat mixed picture. The complaint
was issued on March 24, 1998, charging anticompetitive patent pooling,
price fixing, and fraud on the part of VISX in obtaining a key patent.
Trial commenced on December 14, 1998, closing arguments were com-
pleted on February 24, 1999, and the decision was issued in May 1999.
The Administrative Law Judge found that extraordinary circumstances
justified a 60-day extension of the rule period.411 Clearly, although there
has not been complete success for the new rule, it nonetheless has had an
obvious effect in accelerating administrative litigation at the FTC.
In addition, as a consequence of some other reforms, the Commis-
sion has been far more diligent in issuing opinions in a timely manner.
In two of the three litigated cases decided most recently-California
Dental Association412 and International Association of Conference Inter-
preters413-the Commission issued its opinion within four months after
the cases were argued.
406 See supra Part I.D.3. The case involved issues of vertical and horizontal collusion,
market power, and intriguing issues of legal interpretation.
407 See In re Toys 'R' Us, Inc. No. 9278, 1998 FrC LEXIS 119, at *1 (Oct. 13, 1998).
The Decision and Order have been appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. Toys 'R' Us., Inc. v. FTC, Dkt. No. 98-4107 (7th Cir. filed Dec. 7, 1998).
Oral argument was heard on May 18, 1999.
408 124 FTC 456 (Oct. 24, 1997).
409 See supra note 375.
410 No. 9826, 1999 FTC LEXIS 23, at *1 (Feb. 23, 1999).
411 In September, 1998, the Commission accepted for public comment a proposed consent
order that would settle all of the allegations of the complaint against Summit and part of the
allegations against VISX. See 63 Fed. Reg. 46,452 (Sept. 1, 1998). The patent-pooling and
price fixing charges against both parties were included in the settlement, but the charge that
VISX fraudulently acquired a key patent remained under litigation, although it too was later
dismissed. See No. 9286, 1999 FTC LEXIS 113, at *1. The settlement was made final in
1999. See In re Summit Tech., Inc., No. 9286 (Mar. 7, 1999) (consent order) (visited May 2,
2000) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/dO9286visxd%26o.htm>.
412 121 FrC 190 (1996).
413 123 FTC 465 (1997).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Antitrust enforcement in the past seven years has been particularly
pragmatic, well focused and balanced. But perhaps the most intriguing
change is how the core values of antitrust enforcement are recognized by
an increasingly bipartisan constituency. The antitrust agencies have
charted a prudent middle course, bringing sound, limited enforcement
actions, attempting to clarify the law to facilitate the ability of firms to
compete, and focusing on real world results rather than ideological bat-
tles. Unlike the 1980s, antitrust is rarely the subject for political battle
before Congress. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the leadership of
the enforcement agencies, not yet fully achieved, will be the develop-
ment of a bipartisan consensus of the value of antitrust enforcement to
the competitive process and the American economy. As the U.S. econ-
omy faces the challenges of the 21st century world economy, antitrust
will play a critical role in assuring consumers receive the benfets of a
competitive marketplace.
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